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ABSTRACT
PRESIDENTIAL PHILOSOPHIES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
FROM THE LONG TELEGRAM TO THE NEW LOOK
John R. Moore
Old Dominion University, 1995
Director: Dr. Lorraine M. Lees

American foreign policy often undergoes alteration as
presidential administrations change.

After World War II

President Harry S. Truman and President Dwight D. Eisenhower
both implemented a foreign policy aimed at containing the
Soviet Union, but the philosophical underpinnings of their
foreign policies differed greatly.

While the demands of

partisan and international politics account for some of this
difference, the impact on foreign policy of the two men's
personalities deserves attention and investigation.

In

other words, how did the individual backgrounds, personal
beliefs and world views of Truman and Eisenhower dictate
their approach to foreign policy?

The sources used in this

study include the personal papers, biographies, and public
statements of both men, housed in the National Archives and
the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The determination of the forces which shape a country's
foreign policy requires the integration of the president's
personal philosophy, background, and experience with the
needs of the nation and its ongoing policies and
obligations.

Both President Harry S. Truman and President

Dwight D. Eisenhower faced daunting challenges in pursuing
the national security interests of the United States.

Both

men brought the sum of their individual philosophies,
experiences, and beliefs to bear upon the unparalleled
foreign policy problems of their presidencies.
This thesis examines the way in which each president
developed and implemented foreign policy in light of his own
personal makeup.

Both Truman and Eisenhower identified the

foreign policy interests of the United States upon entering
office and placed a priority on serving those interests.
The priorities they set reflected the background and
personal philosophy of each president, with each man's
predisposition toward governmental organization, his
preferences for strategic action, his willingness to assume
risks, and his perception of the threat against the United
States shaping his international policies.
1
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The thesis question can be broken down into several
sub-questions.

What foreign policy did President Truman

receive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt?
Truman to develop a policy of his own?

What required

What role did

Truman's personal makeup play in determining this policy?
In Eisenhower's case similar sub-questions are asked and
answered to arrive at a conclusion concerning the role that
his personal makeup played in his foreign policy.

During World War II President Roosevelt conducted
foreign policy in his own informal and highly personal
manner.

Roosevelt's chief objectives were to keep the

Soviets engaged in the war, to ameliorate the harsher
aspects of Soviet rule through increased contacts with the
West, and to integrate the Soviet Union into a post-war
international organization.

Dr. "Win-the-War" used means

ranging from compromise to delay to satisfy these objectives
and to defeat the Axis Powers.

By 1945 FDR's advisors

pressed him to be less accommodating to the Soviets, but
Roosevelt died before making any permanent changes in
policy.

Roosevelt's death also prevented any foreign policy

discussions with his new Vice-President, Harry S. Truman.
Indeed the two men had spoken only six times since the
November 1944 election.1
JNT to NL Memorandum of 4 November 1953, Harry S. Truman
Background,
HST
Appointments
with
FDR,
1935-1945,
Prepresidential File (PPF), Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL),
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On 12 April 1945, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone swore
in Harry S. Truman as President of the United States.
Truman decided to retain Roosevelt’s cabinet and to continue
what he believed was Roosevelt's quid pro quo policy towards
the Soviets.

Truman came away from the 1945 Potsdam

Conference, which was called in part to clear up a number of
Soviet-American disagreements emanating from previous
meetings, convinced that he could deal personally with
Marshall Joseph Stalin.

However, differences in the

interpretation of wartime agreements continued while Soviet
expansionist activities in Europe and the Middle East in
1946 further exacerbated relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union.

By March, 1947 Truman had developed

and implemented a national policy of containment, designed
to resist the further spread of Soviet influence.

What were

the personal factors that caused this former haberdasher and
Senator from Missouri with little experience in foreign
policy to engage the Soviets in a struggle that came to be
known as the Cold War?
Eisenhower, who became president in a more traditional
manner, inherited the policy of containment from his
predecessor but had to develop his own way of continuing its
implementation.

Truman saw the need to devise a foreign

policy to contain the aggressive actions of the Soviets as
demonstrated in Turkey, Iran, and Greece; Eisenhower was
Independence, Missouri.
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equally concerned about Soviet intentions and recognized
that he had to continue the implementation of Truman's
policy.

However, he also had to safeguard the nation's

security in a way consistent with the partisan rhetoric of
the recent presidential campaign, his own concerns about the
United States' economy, and his promise to end the Korean
War.

What were the personal factors and beliefs that

influenced this former five-star general in the continued
development and implementation of the policy of containment
during his administration?
The answer to the question of the personal factors,
beliefs, and motivations Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
brought to bear on the problem of developing foreign policy
can be found by consulting their personal writings, speeches
and documents before and during their terms in office.

This

study's examination of the public and private papers of
President Truman will illuminate the philosophy that led him
to implement his foreign policy.

Such sources, for example,

demonstrate that Truman's simplistic and limited worldview
led him to believe that Stalin would honor his wartime
agreements.

Truman became angry when Stalin did not behave

as other politicians in his experience had.
In a similar manner the writings and the public papers
of President Eisenhower provide insights into the
development and implementation of his administration's
foreign policy, the New Look.

On a personal level his
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correspondence with a life-long friend, Everett (Swede)
Hazlett, revealed Eisenhower's thoughts, motivations, and
general mindset towards the events that took place from 1941
to 1958.

Both public and private documents shed light on

Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism and its connection with the
development of the policy of massive retaliation and the
restraints placed on military budgets during his
administration.

How each president approached the foreign policy
problems of his administration is a topic which has received
little attention by historians, particularly those of the
Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

In a recent study of

the Truman Presidency Richard Kirkendall wrote that a better
understanding of Truman's pre-presidential development was
needed, while Alonzo Hamby lamented that few historians had
investigated the first sixty-one years of Truman's life.2
Richard Immerman in his article "Confessions of an
Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal" noted that
a critical unanswered question of the Eisenhower
literature is whether policy responded to perceived
threats and changes in the international environment, or
whether it was largely generated internally by the
actors' previously established agendas and
2Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Mind and Character of Harry S.
Truman," in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey,
(New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
and Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19.
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preconceptions.3
Immerman describes his critical question in terms of
predispositions, core values, and belief systems.

These

considerations influenced how each president behaved in a
given situation.

Truman entered the presidency as the

reluctant successor to President Roosevelt.

Truman's

background as a county administrative judge in rural
Missouri and as a senator from the same state gave him a
different outlook and parochial view of the world as
contrasted with that of the widely travelled Eisenhower.
Eisenhower entered the White House with a highly
developed view of the world.

His assignments as supreme

commander in Europe, Army Chief of Staff, president of
Columbia University and supreme allied commander of NATO's
forces influenced his outlook and contributed to his
perception of the world and its threats.
Both presidents encountered the same problem: how to
implement a foreign policy that was consistent with their
previous positions and appropriate for the current
circumstances.

Each president solved the problem through

the application of his personal beliefs and philosophy.

How

each proceeded is the subject of this study.

3Richard Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower
Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History
14 (Summer 1990): 323.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE SURVEY
American foreign policy, diplomatic history and
presidential administrations have been the subject of
extensive research and writing by historians.

This is

particularly true of the years after World War II, the
period known as the Cold War.

In recent years declassified

information from government archives has shed more and more
light on the development and execution of foreign policy.
Scholarly writing on the Cold War has gone through
three distinct phases - the orthodox, revisionist and post
revisionist schools of thought.

Most of the writing has

centered about the question of how the Cold War began and
the role played by the presidential administrations during
it.
The orthodox phase contains most of the historical
works written between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s on
the Cold War.

The orthodox historians generally hold the

Soviet Union responsible for the Cold War and the breakdown
of Soviet-Allied cooperation which caused it.

Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., in "Origins of the Cold War," described
the Cold War as the "brave and essential response of free

7
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men to Communist aggression.111

Herbert Feis's From Trust

to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1950 (1970),
Walter W. Rostow's The United States In the World Arena: An
Essay In Recent History (1960), George Kennan's American
Diplomacy. 1900-1951 (1951), and Hans Morgenthau’s In
Defense of the National Interest (1951), to name a few, also
represent the orthodox position.

John W. Spanier provides

perhaps the best insight into the orthodox interpretation of
these years in his American Foreign Policy Since World War
II (1973).2
Vietnam marked a watershed in American life which also
had its impact upon historical writing.

The revisionists

who wrote primarily during this period saw the United States
as responsible for the way the Cold War developed and in
some cases, even responsible for the Cold War itself.

As

scholars of the "New Left" began to write of the TrumanEisenhower years, the revisionist school of historians
challenged the orthodox historians and held that the Cold
’Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War,"
Foreign Affairs 46 (October 1967): 22-52.
2Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the
Cold War. 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970); Walter W.
Rostow, The United States In The World Arena: An Essay in
Recent History (New York: Harper, 1960); George Kennan,
American Diplomacy 1900-1951 (New York: Mentor, 1951); Hans
Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952); and John W. Spanier, American
Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1973).
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War was an outgrowth of American capitalism.3

The

historian most associated with the "New Left's" theme of
revisionism was William A. Williams. In his book, Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (1959) Williams argued that "the tragedy
of American diplomacy . . .
American ideas and ideals."

is that it denies and subverts
Williams went on to blame "open

door expansion" for the failure of American diplomacy.4
Williams wrote that the United States could have
avoided the Cold War if it had been more sympathetic to the
fears and concerns of the Soviet Union.

These concerns

reflected the basic insecurities of the Soviet Union for a
secure western frontier backed up by a guarantee against a
resurgent Germany, and a need for assistance in economic
recovery.

The desire of the American government to maintain

its Open Door Policy in Eastern and Western Europe
threatened the Soviet Union's goals.

The Truman

Administration's subsequent use of "atomic diplomacy" and
economic coercion were prime examples of the emerging
American threat to Soviet security.
In 1961, D.F. Fleming published a two-volume study
which provided the detail to substantiate Williams' seminal
work.

In The Cold War and Its Origins (1961) Fleming

3Joseph Siracusa, The New Left Diplomatic Histories and
Historians: The American Revisionists (Claremont, CA: Regina
Books, 1993), 101-15.
4William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1959), 292.
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contended that Truman's temperament and personal animosity
against the Soviet Union led him to adopt the hard-line put
forward by advisors such as W. Averell Harriman and Dean
Acheson.

This started with economic coercion when Truman

cut off Lend-Lease at the end of the war and continued with
his general reversal of Roosevelt's policies toward the
Soviet Union after less than two years in office.5
In 1965 another revisionist work appeared: Free World
Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold
War by David Horowitz.

Later revised in 1971 at the height

of protest against American involvement in the war in Viet
Nam, this book was a condensed version of Fleming's work,
but levied even harsher charges against Truman and his
advisors.

Horowitz argued that the United States sought to

maintain political oligarchies and military elites in power
and to limit democracy outside the United States.

Another

study, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use of
the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation With Soviet
Power (1967) by Gar Alperovitz accused Truman of using the
atomic bomb to bully the Soviets after economic coercion
didn't alter their behavior.

Alperovitz agreed with

Fleming's thesis that Truman's reversal of Roosevelt's
5D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins.
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961).

1917-1960
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policies began the Cold War.6
As opposition to the war in Vietnam grew, more
historians became receptive to revisionist themes.

Racial

unrest, poverty, civil rights, intervention in Cuba and
opposition to the war shattered the foreign policy consensus
of the fifties and caused the intellectual community to
revise its assumptions about American virtue.

Other works,

such as Gabriel Kolko's Politics of War: The World and
United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (1968); Diane Shaver
Clemens' Yalta (1970); and Lloyd C. Gardner's Architects of
Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy. 19411949 (1970) echoed Fleming's theme.

Kolko stressed the

needs of the American economic system, while Clemens
emphasized individual personalities rather than economic
requirements.

Clemens also rejected Fleming's theory that

Roosevelt's policies were suddenly reversed by Truman,
arguing that Truman's policies were the logical conclusion
of Roosevelt's attempt to alter Soviet behavior.

Gardner

saw Eastern Europe as the cause of conflict over other
spheres of influence; it was particularly in Eastern Europe
that the Open Door Policy brought the United States into
6David Horowitz, Free World Colossus: A Critique of
American Foreign Policy In The Cold War (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1965); and Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima
and Potsdam. The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American
Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1967).
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conflict with the security needs of the Soviet Union.7
In 1975 Daniel Bell wrote "The End of American
Exceptionalism" in which he described how belief in American
exceptionalism "had vanished with the end of empire, the
weakening of power, the loss of faith in the nation's
future."8

Bell specifically claimed that American

exceptionalism, embodied in the idea of the American
Century,

"foundered on the shoals of Vietnam."9

Since the 1970s and early 1980s, historical writing has
reflected a mid-point between the orthodox and revisionist
schools.

This post-revisionist school saw both the United

States and the Soviet Union sharing responsibility for the
Cold War.

The post-revisionists stressed the careful use of

archival materials and the importance of personalities in
shaping post war relations.
revisionists'

They also included

insights into the self-interested nature of

United States' policies.
A critique of the revisionists' methods first emerged
in the form of Robert J. Maddox's New Left and the Origins
of the Cold War (1973).

Maddox questioned the scholarship

7Gabriel Kolko, Politics of War: The World and United
States Foreign Policy. 1943-1945 (New York: Random House,
1968); Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970); and Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of
Illusion: Men and Ideas In American Foreign Policy. 19411949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).
8Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," The
Public Interest 11 (Fall 1975): 197.
9Ibid., 204.
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of the revisionists, claiming that they quoted out of
context, joined disparate quotes, and altered the meanings
of sentences through abbreviation.

The revisionists greeted

The New Left with disdain, but could not ignore Maddox's
work.10
The most damaging rebuttal to the revisionists1 theme
of American perfidy and economic determinism has come with
the increasing availability of new primary sources.

As

early as June 1969, George C. Herring, Jr., writing in the
Journal of American. History, disputed the revisionist1s
theory that Truman canceled Lend-Lease in a deliberate
attempt to coerce Stalin.11

In 1978 Wilson D. Miscamble

wrote in Diplomatic History that Truman's sudden reversal of
Roosevelt's policy grew out of a conversation with British
Prime Minister Anthony Eden on 23 April 1945.12

Eden

convinced the less experienced Truman that blunt talk was
needed when dealing with the Soviets.
Other authors have disputed the revisionist's theme in
detail after detail.

In 1983 John Lewis Gaddis, by now the

dean of the so-called post-revisionist school, argued that
10Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the
Cold War (Princeton, N J : Princeton University Press, 1973).
“ George C. Herring, Jr. "Lend Lease to Russia and The
Origins of the Cold War," Journal of American History 56 (June
1969): 93-114.
“Wilson D. Miscamble, "Anthony Eden and the TrumanMolotov Conversations, April 1945," Diplomatic History 2
(Spring 1978): 179.
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there was no basis to the principal tenets of the
revisionists.13

Post-war American foreign policy did not

resemble the Leninist theory of imperialism which the
revisionists claimed.

United States' foreign policy was not

based on the search for new wealth abroad which the American
capitalist system needed for its survival.

In addition

Gaddis used Vojtech Mastny's Russia's Road to the Cold War
(1979) to show that Stalin pursued his policies without
regard for American sensibilities.14
Writing in Diplomatic History. Gaddis provided an
excellent description of the elements of a new consensus
emerging from the traditionalist and revisionist accounts in
his article, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the
Origins of the Cold War."15

For Gaddis the major

contribution of the post-revisionists to the historiography
of the Cold war was to confirm several key arguments put
forth by the orthodox traditionalists as well as to
recognize the significance of the revisionists'
contributions.

For Gaddis the difference is the use of

systematic archival research.16
13John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist
Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic
History 7 (Summer 1983): 172-73.
14Vo jtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979).
15Ibid., 172-190.
16Ibid., 180.
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More recently writers have gone beyond the
revisionists' theories while retaining some aspects of
revisionism.

This synthesis is due partly to the passage of

time, but also to the availability of additional materials.
Among others, Gaddis himself acknowledges the role of
economic pressure in American foreign policy, but notes that
economic policy supported political goals.

He also joins

the revisionists in questioning the intention of the Soviet
Union to achieve world-wide dominance, but points out that
earlier revisionist accounts failed to perceive that
Stalin's defensive goals posed security problems for the
West.17
The most recent collection of the views of both
revisionists and post-revisionists is The End of the Cold
War: Its Meaning and Implications (1992) edited by Michael
J.Hogan.

This work, which revisits most of the arguments

about the Cold War, also includes interesting speculation
about the future of the world after the end of the Cold War.
However, even with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
end of the Cold War, some revisionists still persist in
their view of the United States as the evil genius of the
Cold War.18

A 1994 article by Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird

demonstrates this view.

In "The Centrality of the Bomb,"

17Ibid., 181.
18Michael, J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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they argue that possession of the bomb was the chief enabler
of Truman's postwar strategy.19
Included in Hogan's collection of twenty-two essays are
those by Bruce Cumings, Ronald Steel and Noam Chomsky.

For

these writers the Soviet Union was always a second-rate
power eventually destined to fall due to internal causes.
The United States had magnified the Soviet threat out of
proportion in an effort to dominate the Third World.

In a

similar vein Samuel F. Wells, Jr. argues that President
Reagan's defense build-up finally made the Soviets recognize
the failure of their economic system and their inability to
compete with the United States in the production of modern
military systems such as the Strategic Defense
Initiative.20
A reviewer of Hogan's book, Robert A. Divine, wrote in
September 1993 that the end of the Cold War was leading to
the same division among scholars as its origins had.21
Divine closes with the comment that "if the end of the Cold
War is bad news for the American economy, it may well prove
to be a godsend for historians, or at least those willing to
master the Cyrillic alphabet."22
19Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, "The Centrality of the
Bomb," Foreign Policy 94 (Spring 94): 4.
20Hogan, The End of the Cold W a r , 5.
21Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War as History," Reviews
In American History 22 (September 1993): 527.
22Ibid., 532.
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American foreign relations in general have also been
the subject of orthodox (i.e. nationalist), revisionist and
post revisionist writers.

After World War I, historians

such as Samuel Flagg Bemis and Dexter Perkins described
United States' diplomacy in the orthodox terms of the growth
of power and the creation of a series of principles such as
the Monroe Doctrine.

Progressive historians such as Charles

Beard challenged this nationalist perspective and sought to
discover the intellectual assumptions that governed policy
makers and diplomats.

Where the nationalists stressed

continuity in diplomatic history, the progressive historians
saw change as the major feature of American foreign
relations.
A few years later, realists such as George Kennan and
Hans J. Morgenthau began to question the ability of foreign
policy makers to control an increasingly complex and
dangerous international system.

Pessimism and a critical

approach became the hallmarks of the realists who minimized
the influence of public opinion and domestic politics on
diplomacy and saw the need for policy making by professional
elites.

The revisionists, as previously noted, concentrated

on the motives behind American diplomacy.
such as John Lewis Gaddis redirected

Postrevisionists

attention to the state

and its governing elites as the principal foci of foreign
relations.

Combining elements of the revisionists' approach

and the criticism of the realists, the postrevisionists see
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foreign relations driven by the geopolitical concerns of the
elite, not by domestic pressures.
On the other hand, the 1983 book by Hugh Thomas, Armed
Truce: The Beginning of the Cold War 1945-1946 (1987)
incorporates evidence from Nikita Khrushchev, Svetlana
Alliluyeve, and others to the effect that the Soviet Union
aspired to world influence, if not hegemony.23

The cause

of the Cold War for Thomas was the communist ideology which
held that conflict between communist and capitalist worlds
was inevitable.
Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson have assembled
an overview of the current state of scholarship on the
history of American foreign relations in their joint work,
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (1991)
which centers on the "fracturing of the Cold War
consensus.1,24

This collection of essays illustrates the

current approaches to the study of American foreign
relations.

For instance, Thomas J. McCormick describes the

world systems approach, while Louis A Perez, Jr., outlines
the dependency theory to describe the relationship between
the United States and Latin America.

The theory of

bureaucratic politics by J. Garry Clifford follows the
23Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold
War. 1945-1946 (New York: Atheneum, 1987).
24Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, eds.,
Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7.
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balance of power approach by Stephen Pelz.

Richard H.

Immerman's essay explores the relationship between
psychology and the history of foreign relations, while Alan
K. Henrikson outlines the mental maps or frameworks used by
diplomats to orient themselves in the world.

Melvin Small

writes of the role of public opinion in the development of
diplomatic and military strategy in the United States as an
approach to the study of foreign relations.

Michael Hunt

describes the notion of ideology to make historians focus on
the cultural values and privilege that shape the
consciousness of policymakers.

Melvyn P. Leffler provides

the national security approach while Hogan himself
illustrates how the corporatist analysis deals with the
political pressures, bureaucratic rivalries and geopolitical
strategy of diplomacy.
Of the approaches offered by Hogan and Paterson, Melvyn
Leffler's use of the concept of national security seems the
most balanced in its considerations of motives, perceptions
and the use of national power. In his essay "National
Security," Leffler borrows a definition of national security
from a 1966 article: "national security encompasses the
decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic
core values from external threats".25

Leffler sees

national security as the synthesis of the realist and
25P.G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, "The Emerging Field
of National Security," World Politics 19 (October 1966):
122-36.
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revisionist approaches which integrates questions of
political economy/ military policy, and defense strategy.26
For Leffler this approach assumes that foreign threats
result from both real dangers in the external environment as
well as ideological precepts, cultural images and mistaken
perceptions.27

Leffler elaborated on his approach in his

seminal work, A Preponderance of Power: National Security,
the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.

Leffler argues

that Truman and his advisors sought a "preponderance of
power" because of fears and uncertainties about the postwar
world.

Results were mixed; mistakes were made out of

concerns about the correlations of power which far
outweighed concerns over the economy of the United
States.28
Akira Iriye had previously described the intercultural
relations approach in his 1979 article,

"Culture and Power:

International Relations as Intercultural Relations," noting
"the relationship between a country's cultural system and
its behavior in the international system were the most
26Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in Hogan and
Patterson, Explaining the History of Foreign Relations. 203.
27Ibid.
28Idem, A Preponderance of Power: National Security,
the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1992), 15-16.
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interesting and fruitful fields of investigation.1,29

By

comparison Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods in their
article "Origins of the Cold War In Europe and the Near
East: Recent Historiography and the National Security
Imperative"30 suggest that the national security imperative
represents a synthesis and perhaps a dominant approach to
the Cold War.

For Jones and Woods, the national security

imperative integrates the effect of both the domestic and
the international forces behind American diplomacy.
The fourth volume of the Cambridge History of American
Foreign Relations describes the United States and the Soviet
Union from 1945 to 1991. The editor, Warren I. Cohen, also
sees the security dilemma as the cause of the Cold War, as
the Soviets responded to security actions by the United
States which the Soviets perceived as threatening.

The

Soviets also had problems understanding and judging
responses to their actions by the United States.

Cohen

especially sees the Korean War as Stalin's "most disastrous
Cold War gamble as it would intensify a confrontation that
continued for forty years at enormous cost to the major
29Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International
Relations As Intercultural Relations," Diplomatic History 3
(Spring 1979), 116.
30Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "Origins of the
Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Recent Historiography
and the National Security Imperative," Diplomatic History 17
(Spring 1993): 251.
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antagonists and the rest of the world."31

In his

conclusion Cohen writes that Soviet suspicion of the United
States' intentions combined with knowledge of the
superiority of its weapons and remembrance of Western
hostility to the Soviet state drove the Soviets to take
steps to increase their security.

These steps in turn

affected strategic thinking in the United States which was
reflected in its rearmament program.32 That the ensuing
competition became hostile and evolved into the Cold War was
due to the nature of the Soviet regime - "a powerful and
vicious dictatorship, a ruthless totalitarian state."33

Just as American foreign policy has been the subject of
different views and opinions, historical scholars and other
writers have examined and studied Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower.

Truman does not seem to have been as

controversial a subject for revisionist scholars: they cite
him as the cause of the Cold War.

Most of the newer studies

of the Truman Administration demonstrate that the
administration sought to spread American economic and
political principles overseas but question whether the
31Warren I. Cohen, ed., America in the Age of Soviet
Power, 1945-1991. vol 4, The Cambridge History of American
Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 66.
32Ibid. , 250.
33Ibid., 254.
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motive was "national self-aggrandizement and whether
America's postwar search for security left no room for
Soviet security."34
On the other hand, historical writers in Eisenhower's
case initially questioned his skill as a president and saw
him as one who accomplished little during his
administration.

In the 1980s, a new revisionist image of

Eisenhower emphasized his skill in dealing with the
Congress, in ending the Korean War and avoiding other
conflicts, and in balancing defense needs against the
necessity of maintaining a limit on military spending.

The

post revisionists do, however, fault Eisenhower for the
failure of most United States' activities in the Third
World.
Positive biographies of President Truman include his
own two-volume autobiography, Memoirs (1955).

Robert H.

Ferrell, the dean of Truman scholars, wrote The
Autobiography of Harry S . Truman (1980) from Truman's own
sketches about himself, Off The Record: The Private Papers
of Harry S Truman (1980), Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry
to Bess Truman. 1910-1959 (1983), and Harry S. Truman: A
Life (1994).

Another Truman scholar, Robert J. Donovan, has

also written a two-volume study of the Truman Presidency,
Crisis and Conflict (1977) and The Tumultuous Years (1982).
Trumari's daughter, Margaret, wrote about her father in Harry
34Jones and Woods, "Origins of the Cold War," 255.
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S. Truman (1973).35
Other works on the Truman Presidency include the not
impartial The Man of Independence (1950) by Jonathan
Daniels, the insightful Truman (1986) by Roy Jenkins, John
Hersey's detailed Aspects of the Presidency (1980), and
Cabell Phillips' firsthand observations as a reporter in The
Truman Presidency. The History of a Triumphant Succession
(1966).

Merle Miller compiled the reminiscences of the

elderly president in Plain Speaking (1974).

David

McCullough's Truman (1992) is the latest full-scale
biography which presents a positive assessment of the
president.36
Historical writing about the Eisenhower Presidency has
changed more over the years.

As previously noted, scholars

initially questioned his ability as president and came to
36Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 1955); Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years
of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1965); Robert H.
Ferrell, ed., The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman (Boulder,
CO: Associated University Press, 1980); Robert H. Ferrell,
ed., Off The Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman
(New York: Harper and Row, 1980); Robert H. Ferrell, ed.,
Dear Bess: The Letters from Harry to Bess Truman. 1910-1959
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1983); and Robert H. Ferrell, Harry
S. Truman: A Life (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri
Press, 1984).
36Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence
(Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1950); Roy Jenkins, Truman (New
York: Harper and Row, 1986); John Hersey, Aspects of the
Presidency (New Haven and New York: Ticknor and Fields,
1980); Cabel Phillips, The Truman Presidency, The History of
a Triumphant Succession (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Merle
Miller, Plain Speaking (New York: Berkeley, 1974); and David
McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
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the conclusion that he was beyond his depth in the
presidency.

In the 1970s revisionist scholars, such as Elmo

Richardson who published The Presidency of Dwight D.
Eisenhower in 1979, challenged this conclusion.

Other

important revisionist works include Harbet Parmet's
Eisenhower and the American Crusades (1972), Blanche Cook’s
Dwight David Eisenhower: Antimilitarist in the White House
(1974); Peter Lyon's Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero
(1974); Charles Alexander's Holding the Line: the Eisenhower
Era. 1952-1961 (1975); and Gary Reichard’s The Reaffirmation
of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eightv-Third Congress
(1975).37
Biographical works include Eisenhower's own Mandate for
Change. 1953-1956 (1963) and Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (1965).
Ike's Letters To A Friend (1984) contain his views on a
variety of topics.

Complementary biographies include

Stephen Ambrose's two-volumes, Soldier, General of the Army.
President-Elect 1890-1952 (1983) and The President (1984);
Parmet's Eisenhower and the American Crusades (1972), R.
37Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D.
Eisenhower (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas,
1979); Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades
(New York: Macmillan, 1972); Blanche Cook, Dwight David
Eisenhower: Antimilitarist in the White House (St. Charles,
MO: Forums In History, 1974; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower:
Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); Charles
Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era. 1952-1961
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975); and Gary
Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and
the Eightv-Third Congress (Knoxville, TN: University of
Tennessee Press, 1975).
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Alton Lee's Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman
(1981); and Peter Lyon's critical Eisenhower: Portrait of
the Hero (1974).38
The most valuable primary source on both Truman and
Eisenhower is the U.S. Department of State' series. Foreign
Relations of the United States.
is the

Another exceptional series

Public Papers of The Presidents.

The final

authority on each president is of course the materials in
his presidential library.

The social upheaval engendered by the Viet Nam War and
the changing nature of the inquiry into American history
have influenced historical writing about the Cold War, the
conduct of foreign relations and the presidencies of Truman
and Eisenhower.

As time passes the method of inquiry

becomes broader and more encompassing.

The recent emphasis

on the national security imperative provides a glimpse of
its ability to tie together the many factors involved in a
i!!Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate
for Change. 1953-1956 (Garden city, NY: Doubleday, 1963;
Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace.
1956-1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965); Robert W.
Griffith, ed., Ike's Letters To A Friend, 1941-1958
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1984); Stephen
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier. General of the Army,
President-Elect 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1983); Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower. The President (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower
and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972); R.
Alton Lee, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981); and Peter Lyon, Eisenhower:
Portrait of the Hero (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).
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study of American foreign relations.
The subsequent sections of this thesis will build upon
this literature and will answer the question: What did each
president bring to his presidency and its foreign relations?
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CHAPTER 3
HARRY S. TRUMAN
In March 1941 Harry S. Truman became Chairman of the
Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Defense Program.
He was fifty-seven years old and little known outside
Washington, D.C. and the state of Missouri.

He was first

elected to the Senate in 1934, but had not noticeably
distinguished himself during his first term.

He had,

however, made inroads among the established members of the
Senate and had won high marks in spite of his connections to
the infamous Pendergast machine of Kansas City.

He was

popular with his fellow senators and became a first-rate
committee chairman.1

In a little more than thirty-six

months Harry Truman became President of the United States
and brought the nation into the unknown territory of World
War II's aftermath.
President Truman frequently acknowledged his lack of
preparation for his new position, but he is as frequently
acknowledged as one of the best of the modern presidents.
What did this former haberdasher from Missouri bring to his
duties and the "the hardest job in the world" that made him
Do n a l d H. Riddle, The Truman Committee: A Study in
Congressional Responsibility (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1964), 16-17.
28
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as successful as he was?

What ideological baggage did Harry

S. Truman bring to the White House when he was sworn in as
President on 12 April 1945?
Kirkendall wrote:

As the historian Richard

"We need a better understanding of his

pre-presidential development."2
This chapter will describe the pre-dispositions that
Harry Truman brought with him to the White House.

It will

demonstrate that Truman had already established himself as
an internationalist and that he was well-versed in domestic
politics at the national level.

While Truman had little

opportunity to meet with President Roosevelt before his
death, Truman had his own ideas about foreign policy and
relations with other nations after the war.

Dean Acheson commented that he thought Truman had
experienced "the presidency in miniature" during his tenure
as a country administrator with foreign affairs reduced to
dealing with the sovereign state of Missouri.

Truman

learned how complicated it was to run government and also
gained an understanding of the difficulties of
administration.

He understood the frustrations of the

governmental process in which democracy dilutes the elements
of command and authority.

He had training in decisiveness

2William F. Levantrosser, ed., Harry S. Truman: The Man
from Independence (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 25.
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and did not, as General Marshall had said, "fight the
problem."

He solved it.3

As Chairman of the Senate investigating committee,
Truman honed the political skills he would later use as
President in dealing with foreign leaders.

He preferred to

use quiet persuasion rather than public confrontation to
induce contractors and government agencies to correct abuses
uncovered by his committee's investigations.

When

persuasion failed, Truman "got tough."4
No aspect of Truman's attitude and experience was more
defining of his approach to foreign affairs than his
intuitive grasp of the political center.

Just as he

disdained the extremism of the left and the right in
American politics, he did not distinguish between the
totalitarianism of the left and the right in foreign
affairs, an attitude which was deeply rooted in his own
Midwestern background.5

He believed in America's mission

3David S. McLellan and David C. Acheson, eds., Among
Friends: Personal Letters of Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd,
Mead and Company, 1980), 329.
4Deborah Welch Larson, "Belief and Inference: The
Origins of American Leaders' Cold War Ideology" (Ph.D.
diss., Stanford University, 1983), 205.
sAlonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: FDR
to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 71.
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in the world and held a conviction

that totalitarianism of

the Left was as menacing as that of the

Right.6

Background
Harry Truman was one of the last presidents born in the
nineteenth century, but he was a product of the great
tensions of the early twentieth century.

His public life

was shaped by the increasing gulf between the urban and the
rural and the growing conflict between the small-town
America of shops and farms and themodern United

States of

cities and large corporations.7
Truman's family was fervently attached to the
Democratic Party.

Its tenets were even more deeply

instilled in him than his Baptist heritage.9 The life of
his grandfather, Solomon Young, provided an example and a
definition of personal advancement: economic success was the
product of a solitary entrepreneur who risked a small stake,
worked hard and eventually prospered.9

His father defined

masculinity for Harry as a simple, rough-and-ready
6Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Mind and Character of Harry S.
Truman" in The Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey,
(New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
and Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52.
7Robert Griffith, "Forging America's Postwar Order:
Domestic Politics and Political Economy in the Age of
Truman," Lacey, 85.
8Lacey, The Truman Presidency, 22.
9Ibid., 21.
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willingness to speak bluntly and be ready to fight.

He

passed along to Harry a reputation for honesty and the
family way to prosper: taking big risks with small stakes in
the hope of big gains.10

His mother gave Harry a set of

values and characteristics that reinforced those of his
father, those of the honest, hard-working, plain-speaking
rural culture of the Midwest.11
Like most Americans of his time, Truman was caught up
in the tensions of a nation emerging onto the world scene.
Truman's early years mirror the triumph of American
nationalism, the decline of rural life and influence, and
the rise of a dominant urban culture.

He was a firm

believer in progress and quickly outgrew the small village
of his youth.

He embraced the metropolis of Kansas City,

but retained his small town roots.

He aligned himself with

the forces of modernization - the Farm Bureau, the good
roads movement, and the advocates of planning and efficiency
in government.

He also carried a life-long resentment

against the large and powerful financial interests and their
captive politicians who had kept him from the American dream
of fame and wealth because of his failed businesses.12
10Ibid., 23.
"Ibid., 23.
"Robert Griffith, "Harry S Truman and the Burden of
Modernity," Reviews in American History 9 (September 1981):
303.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33
Truman's early life as a businessman, civic leader, and
county administrator made him a "entrepreneurial liberal."
His was the classic experience of the small-town, country
businessman, suspicious of big business and its accompanying
financial establishment; hopeful of rapid economic growth
and development, looking at times to the federal government
for help, but resentful of bureaucratic rules and
regulations.

His future economic policies would reflect

this experience.13
Truman's life was shaped by politics.

He grew up in a

time when politics was still linked to the rural networks of
family and friends.

Loyalty and friendship were the most

important values in this highly personalized culture.
However, Truman's faith in efficiency and organization and
the rush of national and world events pushed him into a new
and different world of bureaucratic politics.14

Truman was

also a business manager who saw ordinary partisan politics
as a regrettable necessity at the local level.

To the

greatest extent possible, he sought a reputation as a tightfisted budget manager, not as a dispenser of favors and
social benefits.15
13Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers. 63.
“ Griffith, "HST and the Burden of Modernity," 305.
“ Alonzo L. Hamby, "Harry S. Truman: Insecurity and
Responsibility," in Fred I. Greenstein, ed., Leadership In
the Modern Presidency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1988), 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
Harry Truman grew up in a society that venerated
masculine strength and leadership.

As a boy, he revered

Andrew Jackson as one of his heroes.
admired strong presidents.

Throughout his life he

His reading of the Constitution

reinforced his belief that the presidency was a position of
power.

The example of FDR underscored these lessons and

left him determined to defend his office against all
encroachments, just as he had defended his county's fiscal
responsibility against the spoils system of local
politics.16
Truman believed firmly in the American form of
government set up under the Constitution with its separation
of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the federal government and its division of
powers between the central government and the states.

He

did not want to encroach on the powers of the other federal
branches and, as a border state politician, did not want to
interfere with states' rights.

He respected the presidency,

but did not make it imperial.
On economic questions Truman supported free enterprise,
free trade, personal freedom to chose one's own career, and
a minimum of governmental regulation.

Economic abuses

justified corrective legislation, but not interference with
individual initiative.

He believed in a balanced budget and

fiscal responsibility.

He preferred to meet economic

16Ibid., 60.
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problems by stimulating the growth of industry.

Consistency

did not bother him when sometimes his conservative views
conflicted with his Fair Deal programs; he tried to meet
each problem as it came.17 Although he was an ardent and
partisan Democrat in politics, he was in many ways
indistinguishable from the petit bourgeois Republican whom
Sinclair Lewis satirized as George F. Babbitt.

Like

Babbitt, Truman was a small businessman who espoused the
idea that business methods were applicable to government.18
Harry Truman believed that one of the reasons for the
increased cost of local government was the increased demand
for public services at the expense of the public treasury.
Too much was being asked of the state.

"The tendency is

toward rather socialistic and paternalistic things.

. . .

Let people go back to working for themselves and supporting
their dependents, rather than expect the state to do it."19
He believed that it was the nature of governments to expand
and wanted to consolidate departments that did the same work
and to place the government on an "economic way to make
“ Harold F. Gosnell, Truman's Crises: A Political
Biography of Harry S. Truman (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1980), 555.
18Greenstein, Leadership in the Modern Presidency. 50.
“ Harry S. Truman's Address to the Club Presidents
Round Table, Spring 1931, Personal Correspondence: Harry S.
Truman-County Judge, Box 1, Lou E. Holland Papers, HSTL.
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government and public service efficient."20

Truman,

however, believed in using the power of the government to
advance social causes and human rights.
Truman's experience in Jackson County had convinced him
that public contractors were not good spenders of public
funds unless they were watched.

He remembered too that

after World War I nineteen separate committees had been set
up to investigate how the country's money had been spent in
the war effort.

Truman captured Congress'

imagination with

the idea of a committee to do the watching during the war
rather than after the fact.

Mr Truman revealed in his

management of this committee his political methods.

He did

not run it as a one-man show; he delegated matters to other
members, but when it came to decisions, he made them or
others did in accordance with his ideas.21

Government Efficiency
Early in his political career Truman developed an
interest in the size and efficiency of government.

In 1930

while he was a Presiding Judge in Missouri, he introduced a
bill to eliminate unnecessary duplication of service and
division of authority.

Later during his term as Presiding

20Harry S Truman's Address to the Real Estate Board of
Kansas City, 25 September 1931, Personal Correspondence:
Harry S. Truman-County Judge, Box 1, Holland Papers, HSTL.
21Luther Huston, "Truman's Record Shows Practical,
Prudent Man" New York Times. 15 April 1945, 4b.
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Judge, Truman turned more and more to centralization, an
experience that would serve him well as a New Deal senator
and vice president.22

Truman was to say later that the

federal budget involved much larger funds than that of
Jackson County, Missouri, but that the "principles were the
same. "23
Stemming from his investigation of the national defense
program, Truman went on record a number of times in
opposition to

having a number of competing and conflicting

agencies charged with similar and overlapping
responsibilities.

He proposed time and time again the

elimination of such duplication and the concentration of
responsibility in one administrator.24
He attributed responsibility for nearly all the
failures and shortcomings which his Senate Committee found
to three basic weaknesses in war programs: inadequate
initial planning and delay in determining basic policies;
second, conflicting authority over and responsibility for
various war programs resulting in delays and the avoidance
of responsibility; and third, hesitancy to adopt unpopular
22Eugene F. Schmidtlein. "Truman the Senator" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Missouri, 1962), 44.
23Ibid., 124.
24Resume of Information and Statements Which May
Indicate or Suggest Possible Policies of President Truman,
n.d., 77, Biographical File, President's Secretary's Files
(PSF), Harry S Truman Papers, HSTL.
(Hereafter cited as
Resume with page number.)
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or unpleasant policies long after the facts clearly showed
such policies were necessary.

He saw a need for clearly

defined centralized authority, exercised by a few officials,
each solely responsible for the administration of certain
activities.

These officials should meet frequently to

eliminate all conflicts of jurisdiction and be ready to
advise the president on important questions of policy while
relieving him completely of purely administrative work.25

World Peace and Collaboration
In a speech before the Women's National Democratic Club
on 6 March 1944, Senator Truman declared that the only
"logical basis" for a lasting peace was an improved United
Nations, headed by Britain, China, Russia and the United
States.

Only a system of collective defense could ensure

lasting peace.26

On another occasion he said that

expanding trade through reciprocal arrangements could
forestall the growth of economic dissatisfaction out of
which grew world wars. 27
By 1944 Truman was leader of a group of senators who
were generally in agreement on foreign and domestic policy.
He designed the Burton, Ball, Hatch Hill (B2H2) Resolution
which favored postwar participation in an international
“ Ibid., 22.
“ Ibid., 53.
27Ibid., 46-47.
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body.28

During the Democratic Convention Truman called

upon his party to take part in world affairs after this war
and to maintain the peace by using the armed forces, if
necessary.29

He supported Senator Claude Pepper's

amendment to the Connally Resolution, which aimed at
substantially strengthening the United States' commitment to
the establishment of a more positive form of world
organization.

Truman declared that a few willful senators

had prevented the United States from entering the League of
Nations in 1919.

"Isolationism cannot end and will not end

unless the Senate is willing to end it."

He was sure that

the current world war had resulted from the isolationist
posture of the United States.

He was equally sure that

another war would follow shortly unless the United States
and its allies worked together for peace in the same manner
they had worked together for victory.30

Commenting on the

1944 Democratic platform which he helped draft, Senator
Truman stated "the United States will take part in world
affairs this time and maintain the peace by using the Army
and Navy, if necessary."31

28Lacey, The Truman Presidency. 35.
29Robert A. Divine Second Chance: The Triumph of
Internationalism in America During World War II (New York:
Atheneum, 1967), 212.
30Resume, 45.
31Ibid., 53.
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Foreign Relations and National Security
The new president came into office with little obvious
preparation for foreign affairs.

He had made a striking

comment on relations with the Soviet Union in 1941 when
Hitler invaded Russia:
If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help
Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help
Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible
although I don't want to see Hitler victorious under any
circumstance.32
Time magazine characterized Truman as " a man of distinct
limitations, especially in high level politics.
knowledge of foreign affairs is limited."33

. . .

His

However,

Truman brought to the White House certain resources which
helped him carry out a vigorous, assertive foreign policy: a
knowledge of history, political skills, and a characteristic
style of leadership.34
President Truman was not, however, a complete neophyte
in the area of foreign relations.

He brought with him to

the White House a set of assumptions about the cause of war
and the requirements of peace as a result of having lived
through a tumultuous period in world politics.

Dean Acheson

recalled that Truman had experienced the nature, the
importance and the limitations of military power and
32Martin Walker. The Cold War: A History (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1994), 16.
33Resume. 22.
34Larson, "Belief and Inference," 194.
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realized that military power was primarily effective in
opposing military power or in deterring another's use of
it.35
The British policy of appeasement in the 1930s had
convinced Truman that only the willingness to use
preponderant force could deter aggressors.

In a 1944

speech, Truman asked: "Who can say what the results would
have been if France had prevented Hitler from occupying the
Rhineland.

Timely action might have deterred Italy's

conquest of Ethiopia."

Truman also believed that the

failure of the Allied Powers to make a lasting peace with
Germany planted the seeds of World War II.36
President Truman frequently used his knowledge of
history to make points about foreign affairs.

At Potsdam he

declared that he had come to the conclusion after studying
history that the wars of the last two hundred years had
started in the area from the Black Sea to the Baltic and
from the eastern frontier of France to the western frontier
of Russia.

In the last two instances, Austria and Germany

had overturned the peace.

He thought it was the purpose of

the Potsdam Conference to make sure it did not happen again.
35Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years In
The State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 732.
36Speech in Toledo, Ohio, 14 June 1944, Address and
Statement of Harry S. Truman: A Topical Record from January
1935 to April 1945, United States News. File: Addresses and
Statements of Harry S. Truman 1935-1945 (Publication),
Biographical File, Box 298, PSF, HSTL.
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He did not want to go to war in another twenty-five
years.37
In a joint statement with Senators Elbert Thomas of
Utah and Harley Kilgore of West Virginia on 7 March 1944
Truman declared that the industrial accomplishments of the
United States had nominated it as the nation to guide others
in the pathway of peaceful production.

For Truman: "the

future peace depends on the abandonment of political
nationalism and economic imperialism and autarchy."38
Later he said: "We must do our utmost to win the war
speedily and also to contribute our full share to a postwar
atmosphere that will be conducive to an endurable peace."39

Truman based his national defense policy on lessons he
learned before the war.

He favored a strong mobilization

capability over a large standing army because he thought the
American people would not tolerate a large defense
establishment.

He also warned that large defense

expenditures would bankrupt the nation.

Truman believed

37U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam
Conference) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office), 2:303-305.
(Hereafter cited as FRUS with year and
volume number.)
“ "Addresses and Statements of Harry S. Truman: A
Topical Record from January, 1935 to April 1945," United
States News. File: Addresses and Statements of Harry S.
Truman 1935-1945 (Publication), Biographical File, Box 298,
PSF, HSTL.
“ Ibid., 4 July 1943.
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that the economic capabilities and the postwar prestige of
the United States could achieve its security objectives
without a large military establishment.

He favored

universal military training, air power and atomic weapons to
reduce manpower costs as much as possible.40

National Defense Preparedness
I believe in an adequate national defense program. I
think that the old Puritan who prayed regularly for
protection against the Indians was much safer when, at
the same time, he prudently kept his powder dry. Andrew
Jackson, the fighting old President from Tennessee,
said,"We shall more certainly preserve peace when it is
understood that we are prepared for war. The best way to
keep from fighting for liberty and honor is to be
adequately prepared for all contingencies.41
Truman believed in an adequate Navy and an Air Force
second to none, and only enough soldiers for training.
Since ships and aircraft could not be built overnight, they
had to be on hand and prepared.

The United States had to be

prepared enough to defend itself, but not enough to become
an aggressor.42

He declared in the fall of 1945 that the

United States had to shoulder the responsibility of
universal military training for "in order to carry out a
just decision the courts must have marshals" and "in order
40Robert A. Pollard, "The National Security State
Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950" in
Lacey, The Truman Presidency. 207.
41Resume. 57.
42Ibid., 56.
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to collect monies for county government it has been found
necessary to employ a sheriff."43
Truman was definitely committed to a policy of adequate
preparedness as a necessary ingredient in a comprehensive
formula for maintaining peace. In this connection he
advocated that the United States clarify its rights to the
overseas bases it constructed during the war.

He also

wanted the United States to investigate the possibility of
permanently obtaining access to petroleum rights abroad.44
Harry Truman was also an extremely strong advocate of
unification of the armed forces into a single department of
national defense.45.

"Lack of unity of command was one of

the most important circumstances attributing [sic] to the
disaster at Pearl Harbor."

To Truman only divine providence

had protected the United States so far in spite of our
"scrambled professional military setup."46

Harkening back

to his days as an active soldier and a presiding judge,
Truman saw a requirement to consolidate the Army and the
Navy "under
command."

one tent and one authoritative, responsible
Truman believed that Pearl Harbor revealed the

43Thomas G. Paterson. On Every Front: The Making and
the Unmaking of the Cold W a r , rev. ed. (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 1979), 117.
44Resume, 76.
45Ibid., 77.
46Ibid. , 37.
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danger that lies in a division of responsibilities."47

As

late as August 1944 he and his fellow committee members were
still "recording a dreary succession of wastes, duplications
and ugly conflict."46

Senate Voting Record
During the ten years he spent in the Senate, Harry
Truman's voting record reflected his list of priorities on
various foreign and domestic policy issues.

In foreign

affairs he advocated increased American international
involvement, enthusiastically supported the United Nations,
and advocated freer international trade.

In regard to

defense preparedness, party loyalty and an orientation to
crisis action influenced his votes.

In most domestic issues

he followed the party line and administration guidance.49
In 1935 Senator Truman voted for United States'
participation in the World Court.

In 1941 he supported

proposals requiring Senate ratification of the Roosevelt
Administration's Trade Acts and extension of the Selective
Service System and the Ship Seizure Bill, both aimed at
strengthening the United States' preparation for war.

A

47Harry S Truman, "Our Armed Forces MUST Be Unified,"
Colliers. 214 (26 August 1944): 16.
46Ibid., 63.
49Gary M. Fink and James W. Hilty, "Prologue: The
Senate Voting Record of Harry S. Truman," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History 4 (Autumn 1973): 231.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
magazine reporter characterized Truman's voting record as
follows:

"since 1935 his position on foreign relations and

international policy has been consistently on the side of
F.D.R. and for the fight against Fascism.50

Personal Philosophy
A profile of the new vice-president

noted: "It is not

opprobrious in Mr.Truman's lexicon to be called a
politician.

He comes as near as being scornful as his

nature permits when he speaks of officeholders who are not
politicians."

"Government is politics," Truman says, "and

government which is not in the hands of skilled and honest
politicians is less likely to be good government."51
Throughout his political career Harry Truman followed
the "code of the politician" which he had learned from Tom
Pendergast.

The code essentially said that a man who did

not keep his word could never be trusted again.

Truman

always attached great importance to keeping his promises.
He had insisted on paying off all his creditors when it
would have been easier to declare bankruptcy and walk away
from them after his business failed in the 1920s.

Truman's

experience as a member of the Pendergast machine taught him
50"Compilation of Information and Statements Which May
Indicate or Suggest Possible Policies of President Truman,"
Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D.C., April, 1945, PM Magazine. 15 April 1945,
1-2, Biographical File, Box 298: PSF, HSTL.
51Ibid., 8.
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to place the highest importance on the principle of keeping
one's word.

This came to be the standard that Truman used

when he became president to judge all potential political
allies, including Soviet leader Josef Stalin.52
Truman brought this legalistic view to bear on his
foreign relations.

Men with whom he could do business,

whether political bosses or foreign leaders, had to be
honest, at least in the fundamental matter of keeping their
word.

Honest leaders, therefore, scrupulously observed the

agreements they had made with other nations.

To Truman

wartime agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union made at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were crystal clear
with no room for different interpretations of their
obligations.53

Truman later found it intolerable that the

Russians would disregard the Yalta agreements.54
Truman, like Roosevelt, had a tendency to personalize
diplomacy and to conceptualize it in terms of his political
experience.
Roosevelt.

He was, however, less sophisticated than
Stalin impressed him quite favorably at the

Potsdam Conference; affected by Stalin's apparent candor and
by the blunt strength of his personality, Truman remarked
that the Russian reminded him of Tom Pendergast.

"Stalin is

52Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A
Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1985), 132.
53Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers, 74.
54FRUS, 1945 5:235.
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as near like Tom Pendergast as any man I know.
fond of classical music.
a question quickly."

He is very

He can see right straight through

Stalin gave Truman the impression

that, like Pendergast, Stalin meant to stand by his word
when he gave it.55

Truman wrote his wife, Bess, "Stalin

felt so friendly that he toasted the pianist. The old boy
loves music."56

On July 29th he wrote "I like Stalin.

is straightforward.
when he can’t get it.
forthright."57

Knows what he wants and will compromise
His foreign minister isn’t so

Truman also thought he could win him over

with frank talk.
with Stalin.

He

Truman wrote in his diary that "I can deal

He is honest-but smart as hell."56

Henry A.

Wallace wrote on 15 October 1945 that Truman said that
Stalin was a fine man who wanted to do the right thing.59
"It is always easy to understand and to get along with big
men. "60
“ Research Notes Used In Conjunction With Writing The
Man of Independence, Part I, Notes on Interviews, Interview
with Harry S. Truman, 30 August 1949, 4, Daniels Papers,
HSTL. See also Daniels, The Man of Independence. 23, 278.
“ Ferrell, Dear Bess. 520.
57Ibid., 522.
“ Ferrell, Off The Record. 53.
“ Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of
Henry A. Wallace. 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973), 490.
60Joseph E. Davies Diary, 25 July 1945, Davies Papers,
Library of Congress.
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For Truman, it had not been easy to get a commitment
from Pendergast, but when Pendergast made one, he kept it.
Truman felt he could get a division of responsibilities and
territory with Stalin much like the one he had arranged with
Pendergast a decade before when Truman was presiding judge
of Jackson County and Pendergast the Boss of Kansas City.
When the hope of a compromise came to an end, Truman felt
that it was not Stalin's fault, but the fault of the
politburo.61

Truman later stated that Stalin would "stand

by his agreements".62

The Influence of History
President Harry S. Truman made more use of history than
most of his predecessors in the White House.

The lives of

famous men and women intrigued him, but the reading of
biography was more than the romance of heroes, for he looked
into their background to find an explanation for their
success and failure.

In public addresses and in his Memoirs

he clearly acknowledges how the precedents of former
presidents had instructed and encouraged him. 63
61Robert H. Ferrell, "Harry S. Truman: A Chance
President and the New World of Superpowers," Prologue (Fall
1994): 161.
62Eldorous L. Dayton, Give 'em Hell Harry: An Informal
Biography of the Terrible Tempered Mr. T. (New York: The
Devin-Adair Company, 1956), 102.
63R.G. Cowherd, "Mr. Truman's Uses of History,"
Social Studies. 50 (April 1959): 142.

The
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His Memoirs are filled with references to historical lessons
which, he said, guided him in making presidential decisions.
He often remembered how Abraham Lincoln dealt with
recalcitrant generals; how he tried to avoid President
Wilson's errors with Congress; and how he made sure he would
not become another Andrew Johnson.64
In Truman's own words: "My debt to history is one which
cannot be calculated. I know of no other motivation which so
accounts for my awakening interest as a young lad in the
principles of leadership and government."

He was

particularly intrigued by past great administrators.

He

wanted "to know what caused the success or the failures of
all the famous leaders of history.65

The New York Times

described Truman's use of history after he became Vicepresident: "History is Senator Truman's hobby. The study of
it is his chief relaxation. He likes any sort of history,
but his favorites are the constitutional history of the
United States and military history in any form."66
Truman believed in the "great man" theory of history
which holds that the actions of leaders explain historic
events.

In 1939, Truman traced the periodic recurrence of

wars to the inability of Caesar, King Henry IV of France,
64J. Garry Clifford, "President Truman and Peter the
Great's Will," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall 1980): 371.
65Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 119.
66New York Times Magazine. 21 January 1945, 8.
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Napoleon and Woodrow Wilson to carry out their plans for
eliminating trade barriers.

Caesar and Napoleon wanted to

place Europe, Asia and Africa under the control of the same
state, but both failed, the former due to assassination,
the latter due to an adventure in Russia.

King Henry IV

looked to unify Europe under one state, but was also
assassinated before he could put it together.67

Truman

believed that World War I was caused by Germany's need for
raw materials to run her industries and feed her growing
population.68
As one of his most intimate advisors, Clark Clifford,
noted, the knowledge that President Truman had of American
history "was second to none."

Incident after incident came

up which Truman was able to trace back to one that another
president had faced during his administration.

Truman

compared the discussion about the financial and monetary
posture of the United States after World War II to that of
the conflict between Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle, the
leading banker of the day, over the structure of the
American banking system.

Truman's knowledge of history was

"not the kind of knowledge that just depended on dates and
67Congress, Senate. 1939. Speech in Carthersville, MO.
76th Cong., 2nd Sess., Appendix to Congressional Record. (8
October 1939), vol. 85, pt. 2, 202.
“ Congress, Senate. 1939. Speech before the National
Aviation Forum. 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix to
Congressional Record (20 February 1939), vol. 84, pt. 11,
642.
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events, of 1066 being the Battle of Hastings."

For Truman,

"American history with him was the development of policy,
the manner in which the various presidents had met difficult
problems.1,69
The tragedies suffered by the Jewish people during the
war reminded Truman of his Missouri-Kansas ancestors who had
been displaced by the American Civil War.

This led him to

play an important role in the postwar history of the Jews.
Truman insisted on a Nuremberg Tribunal to record the crimes
committed against the Jews by the Nazis.

He called upon the

British to open Eretz Israel-Palestine to Jewish immigrants
and he fought for a revision of American immigration laws.
Truman was the first head of state to recognize the new
state of Israel when its declared its independence.70
Elsewhere in his memoirs, Truman declares that he had
trained himself to look back in history for precedents.

He

later reaffirmed that the lessons of history offered guides
to the "right principles of action."

Truman was convinced

that the League of Nations had acted wrongly in not
combining to resist its first challenges by Japan, Germany
and Italy.

He believed so strongly in these parallels from

69Clark M. Clifford, "The Unique and Inspiring
Leadership of President Truman" in Levantrosser, The Man
from Independence. 381.
70Herbert Druks, "Truman and the Recognition of Israel
Reconsidered," Levantrosser, 55.
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the 1930s that in 1950 he weighed the North Korean invasion
against the balance of these past experiences.71
Always self-conscious about his lack of higher
education, Truman delighted in impressing others with his
knowledge of the past, but his knowledge was neither
systematic nor critical.

He regarded history as a means of

discovering lessons of the past, rather than as a tool of
analysis.

There are frequent references in his diaries and

letters to what anyone from Alexander the Great to Andrew
Jackson would have done in a particular circumstance.

These

lessons tended to reinforce his tendency to emphasize
individual conduct rather than historical or cultural
factors.72

Leadership Style
When Harry Truman became President, he brought to the
White House a characteristic style of leadership acquired
through his 61 years of service in war, business bankruptcy
and elective office.

Truman's experience as a captain of

Army artillery in World War I was one of the most formative
experiences of his life and helped shape his ideas about
leadership.

Leadership for Truman was the "ability to get

other people to do what they don't want to do and like it."
71Ernest R. May. "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and
Misuse of History In American Foreign Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 82-84.
72Ibid., 48.
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In a similar vein, when asked how he would behave as the
head of the nation, Truman replied, "Just as I did when I
was a judge in Jackson County.1,73
The new president was a man of a orderly habits and
thought patterns.

He was disturbed by the patterns of

organizational jurisdiction that he had inherited from
Roosevelt.

Truman established a greater degree of

orderliness than was seen in the Roosevelt White House with
its few clear lines of authority and cognizance.

Truman's

staff organization was one of structured decentralization,
unlike the system of unofficial advisors and conflicting and
overlapping jurisdictions used by Roosevelt.74
His use of the cabinet reflected an almost textbook
approach to the workings of government.

As a constitutional

formalist, he assumed that the president ran the executive
branch and that the cabinet officers were his aides.75

He

would later learn that the cabinet officers were executives
in their own rights and had to be allowed to run their
departments.
He brought to his new position a great sense of loyalty
up and down the organizational ladder by virtue of his long
service as an organization politician.

When Truman became

73S.J. Woolf, "President Truman: A Portrait and
Interview," The New York Times Magazine. 14 October 1945, 5.
74Hamby, "The Mind and Character of HST," 41.
75Ibid., 42.
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the "boss," he expected loyalty and gave an equal loyalty to
his followers and subordinates.

He did his best to smooth

the way for them as they conducted their share of foreign
policy.

He respected their expertise and willingly made

decisions based on their recommendations.76
Truman instinctively acted as a presiding judge in the
White House.

He dealt with issues one after the other, with

little thought of those before and the ones coming in the
future.

He treated matters on a case-by-case basis, and was

careful to receive information from a variety of sources.
He did not seek to find patterns in pieces of information,
or to speculate about their implications.

He concentrated

on the "here and now," looking for what was to be decided,
what bore directly on the case, and tended to dismiss all
else as irrelevant.77
Truman saw the presidency as the focal point of the
government, of the nation and of American history.

He would

not let personal proclivities or self-interest influence a
presidential decision.

Separating the presidency between

the man and the office, he was conscious of each role he
played.

He played chief of state like a gracious host,

leader of his party like an organization politician, and
76Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics
of Leadership from FDR to Carter rev. ed. (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Co., 1980), 127.
77Ibid. , 126.
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chief of foreign policy as a career official reminding all
that politics stops at the water's edge.78
Truman brought to the White House a consummate ability
as a politician.
man in government.

For Truman the politician was the ablest
Truman had acute political instincts,

developed in the election campaigns he had waged for county
judge and senator.

He recognized that foreign policy had to

have the backing of the people.

Only by explaining and

interpreting isolated actions in terms of a wider vision of
the role of the United States could the president gain
popular support for a policy.

In world affairs Truman

conceived of his role as being one of persuading the
American people, rather than issuing edicts and
proclamations.79
Truman saw himself as the heir of FDR, of the New Deal
and of internationalism, but he had had only thirty official
appointments with President Roosevelt between 1935 and April
1945.

Twenty-one of these had occurred before 1943.

Four

had taken place in 1944 (August 18, September 19, November
10, December 21) and five in 1945 (January 2, 9, and 20;
March 8 and 19).80
78Ibid., 129.
79Alfred Steinberg, The Man from Missouri: The Life and
Times of Harry S Truman (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 88-89.
80NT to NL Memorandum of 4 November 1963, Harry S.
Truman Background, HST Appointments with FDR, 1935-1945,
PPF, HSTL.
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The contrasts between Harry S Truman and his
predecessor made the presidential transition even more
shocking., Roosevelt's patrician bearing, his easy
confidence, and his eloquence gave him a presence Truman
lacked.

FDR had been on the national scene for decades as

Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I, as a
vice presidential candidate in 1920 and as governor of New
York. Truman, on the other hand, was a smaller personality.
He had commanded an artillery battery in World War I,
started and lost a business in Kansas City and had served
three terms as a county administrative judge before becoming
senator in 1935.61
The New York Times declared that the way Truman
directed his Senate committee afforded the best yardstick by
which to appraise the methods he might use in handling the
vastly greater responsibilities of his new office.

Those

who looked for great changes should bear in mind his
inherent caution; he might be influenced by a west of the
Mississippi ideology.

Truman thought that politics was a

proper and honorable calling and that government should be
in the hands of capable and honest politicians.82
President Roosevelt liked the bold stroke.

Truman was

less audacious, a great deal less of a political showman and
“ Robert J. Maddox, From War to Cold War: The Education
of Harry S.Truman (London: Westview Press, 1988),
46.
“ Luther Huston, "Truman's Record Shows Practical,
Prudent Man," New York Times. 15 April 1945.
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was not by any means as self-assured and self-sufficient as
his late chief.

Basing their judgment on Truman's

personality and on his almost wholly legislative background
in national affairs, the Times anticipated that political
councils would indeed be councils during the Truman
regime.83

Summary
Truman's principal task, which he managed with only
occasional errors and considerable aplomb, was to turn the
foreign policy of the United States from isolation and
occasional intervention in Europe's affairs to a necessary
participation in world affairs.84

A man with less

historical knowledge might have put his head in the noose of
the isolationists, who quoted Washington's Farewell Address.
Truman compared the isolationists to preachers who quoted
Bible verses out of context.

By relating doctrines to

conditions, Truman became convinced that the growth of the
United States had long ago invalidated Washington's method
of making the United States secure.86
According to Leon Keyserling, Vice Chairman of Truman's
Council of Economic Advisors, Truman was determined to
83Ibid.
84Ferrell, "HST: A Chance President," 153.
86R.G. Cowherd, "Mr. Truman's Uses of History," The
Social Studies. 50 (April 1959): 144.
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remain the type of man he was before he became president.
The problems which confronted Truman challenged him and
enabled him to do many more things than he had ever done
before.

As president, he acted as he did because he was the

kind of man he had always been.
The unimpeachable honesty which resisted political
conditions in Missouri was the same quality that was evident
in the White House.

The loyalty to friends that caused him

criticism in the White House was the same loyalty that he
had demonstrated earlier in Missouri.

As Keyserling put it:

"In essence, Harry Truman did not change much as a man
during his Presidency; it was merely that the flowering was
preceded by the seed and long cultivation."

As President,

"he surprised others, but never himself."86

Just as Truman

saw himself as a reflection of the American common man, he
saw his foreign policy - the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan and Point Four - as a reflection of the American
character, his character: a generosity combined with a
principled toughness.87

The quickness and the firmness of

his foreign policy decisions which were the hallmark of his
tenure as Chief Executive were the same as those he had
exercised as Presiding Judge back in Jackson County.
86Leon H. Keyserling, "Harry S. Truman: The Man and the
President" in Levantrosser, The Man from Independence. 237.
87Norman Podhoretz, "Truman and the Idea of the Common
Man," Commentary 21 (May 1956): 474.
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CHAPTER 4
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
On 20 January 1953, the wartime commander
of the Allied Powers, Dwight David Eisenhower, became the
thirty-fourth President of the United States.

General of

the Army Eisenhower brought a unique background and an
unusual range of experiences to his new position as he took
his place at the pinnacle of American achievement and power.
Eisenhower had already made his mark as a military leader,
but what predispositions from his past did he bring to his
presidency?

Among other character traits, Dwight David Eisenhower
brought to the presidency a style of leadership and
management that he had used to become one of the most
successful military men of the twentieth century.

Part and

parcel of this style was the abiding sense of duty which had
guided and formed his life.

His mother, Ida, had

continually emphasized the virtues of self-reliance, hard
work, and doing one's duty as the most important of personal
values.

Throughout his life Eisenhower held fast to these

60
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values and remembered that his mother's greatest belief was
that of self-discipline.1
Early in the twentieth century, Eisenhower was admitted
to the United States Military Academy at West Point where he
and his fellow cadets were indoctrinated into a Progressive
ideal of an efficient, professionalized Army which carried
with it an accompanying devotion to an apolitical creed.
Politics was seen by the cadets and their superiors as
contentious partisanship and divisive clamor.

It was the

duty of the good officer to avoid the corrupting influence
of politics on teamwork and efficiency.

The concept of duty

was the watchword of the military ideal, the justification
for channeled ambition and the preserver of military virtue.
This overarching ideal of duty was to carry Eisenhower
through the many dry years of Army service.2

Indeed,

he once told his wife, Mamie, "My country comes first.

You

come second."3
Eisenhower always took his responsibilities seriously
and worked hard in whatever activity he was assigned,
winning a string of plaudits from his commanding officers.
General Douglas MacArthur described Eisenhower in an
'Robert E. Gilbert, The Mortal Presidency: Illness and
Anguish in the White House (New York: Basic Books, 1992),
75.
2Robert F. Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Hero and
Politician (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986), 23.
3Michael Beschloss, Eisenhower (New York: Edward
Burlingame, 1990), 28.
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efficiency report, writing: "This officer has no superior of
his time either in command or general staff capacity in the
Army.4
During his Army career four generals took Eisenhower
under their wings and developed mentor or student-teacher
relationships with him: Fox Connor, John J. Pershing,
Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall.

Connor probably

had the greatest influence on Eisenhower's early development
as a strategic thinker while they were both assigned to the
Panama Canal Zone.

For three years Connor instructed

Eisenhower in the military arts.

It was for Eisenhower "a

sort of graduate school in military affairs and the
humanities.

. . .!|S

Connor prepared Eisenhower in

classical military strategy, but he also instilled in
Eisenhower a principle which became a hallmark of
Eisenhower's leadership style and one of the

keys tohis

success, namely the need for allied unity.6
His military duties before World War II

also gave the

future president at least a fringe familiarity with
decisions affecting high officials of the executive branch.
In 1929 as a major, Eisenhower was appointed personal
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War, and in February
“Efficiency Report dated 30 June 1936 by General
Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower Museum, Abilene, KS5Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell To
Friends (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), 178.
6Ibid., 199.
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1933 to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Douglas MacArthur.
Eisenhower's duties concerned such matters as military
budgets, public affairs, and relations between the Executive
Branch and the Congress.7

Eisenhower produced an overall

strategy and blueprint for war mobilization; his plan was
not adopted, but it gave him a detailed knowledge of what
was to become the arsenal of democracy.8 He later
recollected that without the administrative experience he
gained while serving under MacArthur he "would not have been
ready for the great responsibilities of the war period."9
As the war in Europe broke out, Eisenhower began a
spectacular rise to the top of the Army.
was Chief of Staff of the Third Army.

In mid-1941, he

Five days after Pearl

Harbor he was reassigned to Washington by the Chief of
Staff, General George C. Marshall.10

Marshall had been

following Eisenhower's career for several years and believed
that he had acquired the knowledge and maturity to help
shape the strategic plans for the defeat of Germany and
Japan.

While assigned to the War Department, Eisenhower

absorbed Marshall's managerial philosophy, the two most
’David B. Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency and
American Foreign Policy (London: Routledge Paul, 1969), 5-6.
8Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 37.
9Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democracy (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday and Company, 1946), 146.
10Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, eds., The
Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower rev.ed. (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 1991), 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64
important tenets of which were: first, the decision-maker
must not be distracted by problems that subordinates should
resolve for themselves; and second, the assistants must have
ready the precise information needed to make decisions.11
By 1945 Eisenhower had spent thirteen years overseas in
contact with nearly every head of state in Western Europe
and had commanded history's largest army.

He had spoken

with Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Stalin, Roosevelt and ae
Gaulle.

He had commanded forces from France, America,

Britain, the Commonwealth, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
had led the Western Alliance to victory.

He

Never before had a

single individual won the trust and confidence of so many
people and so many competing national interests.

Eisenhower

emerged from the war with expertise in many areas:
intelligence systems, clandestine operations, calculated
risk-taking, censorship, and press conferences.

As Truman's

Army Chief of Staff and the first commander of NATO, he
played a key role in France's eventual decision to join NATO
and he had steered that organization through its formative
years.12

After the war Eisenhower became the symbol of the

victorious Western democracies.

His image was that of the

gentle Christian warrior, the noble crusader returned from
the war against the Nazi infidels.

He inspired immense

“ Ibid., 6.
“ Frederick W. Marks, III, Power and Peace: The
Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles (London: Praeger, 1993), 21.
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public confidence.13

Eisenhower derived additional benefit

from a term as president of Columbia University from 1948 to
1950.14
Eisenhower was a hero seeking national unity and a
return to the code of personal responsibility.

He became

president to change the perception that the state was
responsible for taking the individual from the cradle to the
grave.15

The undeniable call of duty16 and the threat of

Senator Robert Taft's isolationism convinced him to run for
the presidency.17

In the final analysis Eisenhower did not

know which was worse, the danger of national bankruptcy or
isolationism, but he knew he had to stop both.18

He did

not seek the presidency, but managed his public and private
life in such a manner that the presidency sought him.
love was not for power, but for duty.19

His

Moreover,

Eisenhower was supremely confident in his sense of his own
fitness for the job.
13Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 93.
14Ibid., 23.
15Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 374.
“ Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President
(New York,Simon and Schuster, 1990), 246.
17Ferrell, The Eisenhower Diaries. 252.
“ Ibid., 264.
“ Gilbert, The Mortal Presidency. 121.
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Eisenhower was unique among American presidents in that
he had spent all but two years of his career before election
to the presidency in uniform; only Eisenhower among the
modern presidents had never held elective office in his prepresidential career.

However, his experience in foreign

affairs was without parallel among the presidents of the
twentieth century.20

Professional Skills
Eisenhower's military success was due to his ability to
plan and to coordinate complex military operations.

As

Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of war plans under
General Marshall, Eisenhower was responsible for the
preparation of a plan for the invasion of Europe across the
English Channel— in rough outline the same plan he was to
follow two years and three months later.21

Marshall's

office also became a school room in which Eisenhower learned
many lessons useful to him in the final development of his
own command technique.

He learned about the most effective

melding of military and political leadership on the level of
supreme command.

Eisenhower also noted how Marshall allowed

his subordinates to operate within the limits of their
20Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 1.
21Ibid., 6-7.
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abilities, limits which Marshall measured with great
shrewdness .22
Eisenhower saw that Marshall never condescended, never
presumed to issue orders to civilians, and never impugned
the motives of his opponents on specific issues.

Marshall

made no grandiose public gestures calculated to inflame
prejudices or outrage the convictions of those who
distrusted the military.

Marshall counted on the truth to

win its own points; when he won over a former opponent, he
never gloated over it.

In his view, such a victory was

never personal; it meant simply that his former opponent,
like himself, now recognized an objective reality.
Eisenhower applied these lessons exceptionally well both as
the principal Allied commander in Europe and as President of
the United States.23
Eisenhower's success as a commander was also due to two
factors which were particularly relevant to his presidency.
The first was his effort to promote allied unity, teamwork,
and harmony.

Eisenhower was particularly skillful at

finding compromises, sometimes at the expense of weakening
overall strategy, but with the knowledge that frequently
political as well as military considerations had to be taken
into account.

The second factor was Eisenhower's grasp of

22Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 294.
23Paul G. Munch, "General George C. Marshall and the
Army Staff" Military Review 74 (August 1994): 18.
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the requirements of a modern executive which led him to a
view of institutional leadership which was reflected in his
presidency. 24
Eisenhower's postwar appointment as the military
commander of NATO further enhanced his wartime experience.
He honed his diplomatic skills by convincing the European
governments of the need for unity.

At the same time he had

to reassure Americans in Congress and the public at large of
the need for continued American involvement in Europe.25
Eisenhower himself saw a "great carry-over" in the way
he acted as Army general and as president.

He did not

abandon his previous methods of getting information on which
he had to make decisions.

Eisenhower had become accustomed

both as commander and as president to getting essential
information from summary sheets or briefings from his staff.
He would get the facts and the views from people around him,
particularly when they had some expertise in one particular
facet of a problem.26

He continued this practice as

president in order to master the essentials quickly and to
make a decision.

He read portions of books or articles

brought to his attention and continued to show a keen
ability to cut to the heart of an issue.

His extraordinary

24Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 9.
25Ibid., 11.
260ral History Interview with General Dwight D.
Eisenhower by Ed Edwin, 20 July 1967, OH-11, Interview #1:
106, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Abilene, KS.
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involvement in world affairs also provided him with a
breadth of knowledge that awed many of his aides.27
Eisenhower's respect for experts, however,

rarely led him to

accept their judgement over his own in the vital areas of
foreign policy and military policy where he was himself
particularly knowledgeable.28

Leadership Style
During his military career, Eisenhower developed a
style of leadership in which smooth running teams posed
alternatives for his decision.

Policy was made achievable

by seeking consensus among all those operationally
responsible for implementing an action.

He carried over

from his military experience these organizational concepts
and principles of leadership into his new position as
President of the United States.

Due to his personality and

his experiences as a staff officer, Eisenhower placed a
premium on the views of his staff officers and, particularly
when they reached agreement, might favor their position over
his own.

To Eisenhower the duty of a staff was to bring the

leader the minimum number of issues for his decision.

When

the commander's decision was ultimately necessary, the staff
was to come with an agreed upon course of action or clearcut, well-defined alternatives.
27Pach and Richardson, The Presidency of D D E . 40.
28Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 10.
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Writing in I960, Walt Rostow summed up Eisenhower's
leadership principles.

First, the leader should provide

continuity to an organization or institution by articulating
his abiding values and by ensuring that day-to-day decisions
maintained this continuity and conformed to his values.
Second, the leader should refrain from imposing his own
judgements on appropriate courses of action.

He should seek

to create a consensus through mutual persuasion and
negotiation in which the diverse tasks and functions of the
organization are brought into harmony.29
Third, when the leader is forced to make a decision
after the process of persuasion and negotiation are
exhausted, he must take final responsibility for the
decision but in such away that the conflicting interests and
views of the organization are embedded in the decision.
Fourth, when a decision is made, the course of action should
be followed unless an overwhelming case for change is
developed by new circumstances.

Fifth, primary

responsibility for day-to-day policy rests with those
responsible for the particular operational task which had to
be accomplished under conditions of maximum mutual
accommodation.

Finally, the leader must have a strong chief

of staff, capable of forcing decisions to be made at the
29Rostow, The United States In the World Arena. 388.
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lowest level possible and of screening out issues brought to
the leader for action.30
Eisenhower implemented this last principle in the White
House as soon as he assumed office.

He installed a chief of

staff for domestic affairs in the person of Sherman Adams.
As such, Adams was able to function in the same manner as
his military predecessors: Walter Bedell Smith, Lucius Clay,
and Alfred Gruenther.

As president, Eisenhower also

selected men and women for his cabinet who conformed to his
conception of able technicians, the equivalent of his
commanders during the war.

Day-to-day control over routine

matters and foreign policy implementation devolved into the
hands of these department heads while he retained decision
making power on key issues.31

Staff Management
Eisenhower was a master executive, confident in his
abilities to operate large staff organizations.

His command

structure was deliberate, complex, and finely tuned to his
requirements.

He recognized that it was impossible for him

to be personally involved in every detail of every issue. In
his view effective leadership required managerial skills to
sort out decisions requiring the executive's personal
attention from matters of lesser importance which could be
30Ibid., 388.
31Ibid., 190.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
handled by subordinates.

He himself had filled the staff

officer's role enough times to know that no command
structure could overcome the problem of the wrong person in
a key position.

Confident that he had selected the best

person, he then delegated maximum responsibility to his
subordinates and his appointees.32
In dealing with his staff, Eisenhower gave mission
orders and made his subordinates fully responsible for their
actions and their results.
from Marshall was simple.

The technique he had learned
Marshall's relationship with

Eisenhower had been typical of Marshall's mode of leadership
and he followed a similar approach with other officers under
him.

"Army officers are intelligent," General Marshall

would say.

"Give them the bare tree, let them supply the

leaves."33

Marshall defined the task and his expectations

and then ordered the officer to develop a plan.

After

reviewing the plan, Eisenhower, as Marshall had done with
him, directed the officer to execute the plan while
Eisenhower monitored his progress.

Both Marshall and

Eisenhower expected the responsible officer to make timely
decisions within the confines of his responsibility.

Just

as the broad responsibilities given to Eisenhower shortly
after Pearl Harbor were the rule rather than the exception
32Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 263.
33Edgar F. Puryear, Nineteen Stars (Orange, VA: Green
Publishers, Inc., 1971), 81.
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on Marshall's staff,

Eisenhower gave broad responsibilities

to his subordinates when he became a commander in his own
right and later as president.34
According to one of his speechwriters, Eisenhower knew
he wasn't an expert in everything.

Bruce Harlow described

him as a great commander who would depend on his corps
commander to tell him what was going on in the corps.
"That's the way he believed, the way he was trained in
delegation. It was one of his great skills. That's one of
the hardest skills to master — how to delegate."35
In numerous interviews and correspondence, Eisenhower's
staff officers stated that Eisenhower was the boss, that he
was a commander who would listen to all sides of an issue,
extract its root element, and work out a solution.

General

Walter B. Smith, Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff,
described his ability to delegate authority to his staff as
"beautiful."

Eisenhower was so gifted that he could

literally put his finger quickly and accurately on the crux
of the problem under discussion.36
Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, would
echo Smith's words in describing Eisenhower years later.
34Munch, "Marshall and the Army Staff," 20.
35Bruce Harlow, "The "Compleat" President," in The
Eisenhower Presidency: Eleven Intimate Perspectives of
Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, (Lanham, MD:
University of America Press, 1984), 148.
36Puryear, Nineteen Stars. 212.
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"He delegated a maximum of authority, keeping an eagle eye
on what was going on.

He helped me in the selection of

associates without interfering.1137

Teamwork and Cooperation
More than any other event in his life the Second World
War shaped and consolidated Eisenhower's worldview and
leadership philosophy.

The war was a potent lesson in

international relations; the Allies were faced with the
choice of cooperation or domination.

Eisenhower was the

linchpin of the cooperative effort that defeated the
Germans.

He designed and managed the meeting place between

the political and military policies of the United States and
Great Britain, and to a lesser degree, that of the Soviet
Union and France.38
Eisenhower's self-portrait, Crusade in Europe, opened
with the theme of cooperation which would run through the
entire work.

It would be linked with related terms such as

unity, teamwork, allies, and partnership.

The theme

connoted the picture of a leader who believed that the
greatest safety lay in numbers and the soundest wisdom in a
variety of voices.39
37Herbert Brownell, "From Campaigning to Governance" in
Thompson, Eleven Intimate Perspectives. 168.
38Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 131.
39Martin J. Medhurst, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Strategic
Communicator (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 13.
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Eisenhower became increasingly convinced of the need
for "this combined stuff."40

Teamwork to Eisenhower meant

subordinating personal, service, and even national interest
to a common goal.

He often drew analogies from his football

coaching days about the need for "team play."41

The need

for teamwork became a permanent addition to Eisenhower's
leadership philosophy and it resurfaced in nearly every
undertaking.

This sense of teamwork enabled him to work

with leaders as strong-willed as Douglas MacArthur, Bernard
Montgomery, Charles de Gaulle, Admiral Ernest King, and
George S. Patton.

One of his remarkable talents was the

ability to subordinate his personal views to his sense of
duty and the need for teamwork.42
As early as 1943, Eisenhower spoke of "Allied team
play" as one of the greatest gains made from the North
African Campaign.

"Each man here has come to realize that

the greatest patriot, the greatest lover of his country, is
one that is the quickest to promote Allied team play and to
demand its perfection.1143

The war years consolidated

Eisenhower's faith in cooperative approaches to national and
40Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 8 March 1942, DDEL.
“ Eisenhower, At Ease. 16.
“ Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 20 April 1942, DDEL.
“ Radio talk by Gen Eisenhower for North African
Program of BBC, 24 May 1943. Box 192, Principal File (PF),
Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, Pre-presidential, 1916-52
(PPP), DDEL.
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international security.

The teamwork concept he applied to

his staff operations during the war appealed to him in a
much broader sense than as only a mechanism to persuade
individuals to work together.

If nations could work

together in war, why couldn't they in peace?44
Following the war Eisenhower spoke of teamwork as the
device to preclude wars of the future.

In January 1946, he

declared: "nations that joined together to defeat ruthless
enemies have even greater reason to remain united for the
peaceful settlement of their differences lest new Hitlers
rise to throw the world into a chaos more awful than the
shattered countries of Europe present today."45

In April

1946, Eisenhower said "We must remain united in working for
security in peace as we did for success in war."46

In

November Eisenhower would plead for cooperation "because
only cooperation will make this country great.

. . . Guns

and tanks are nothing unless there is a solid spirit, a
solid heart, and a great productiveness behind it.47
Eisenhower saw that cooperation and teamwork were also
needed within the Armed Forces.

Unlike Truman who wanted to

44Eisenhower, Crusade In Europe (New York: Doubleday,
1978), 486.
45Speech before Canadian Club, Ottawa, Canada, 10
January 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
46Army Day Speech, Chicago, II., 6 April 1946, Box 192,
PF, PPP, DDEL.
47Address before the Economic Club of New York at
Dinner Meeting, 20 November 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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unify the Armed Forces to reduce duplication and government
spending, Eisenhower wrote on 27 November 1945 that he
wanted to foster "the closest possible kind of association
among individuals" and to promote a spirit of teamwork among
the services that would lead to the "model of unified,
integrated and enthusiastic cooperation" he had engendered
in Europe during the war.48

Personal Philosophy
Eisenhower's famous address at Guildhall, London,
England on 12 June 1945 contained many of the themes and
attitudes that would characterize his postwar stances:
cooperation, sacrifice, duty and humility.
No petty differences in the worlds of trade, national
traditions and pride should ever blind us to these
spiritual, priceless values. If we keep our eyes on this
guidepost, then never can there be encountered a
difficulty in our road of mutual cooperation that will be
insurmountable.49
While the public only knew Eisenhower through wartime
dispatches and occasional human interest stories,
Eisenhower would emerge over the next several years in
speeches and letters as a special representative of the
common man, with a dedication to high ideals, a
consideration of others, humility and a special sort of
moral vision.

This speech provided an initial glimpse into

"Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 28-29.
49Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 131.
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philosophy and beliefs of this wartime leader and future
president.50
Eisenhower brought to the presidency a belief that the
struggle between the East and the West represented two
ideologically opposed systems.

To him one system

represented statism while the other represented the dignity
of the individual, who had a soul and certain inalienable
rights that could not be taken away.51

Human dignity,

economic freedom and individual responsibility were the
characteristics that distinguished democracy from all other
governmental forms devised by humankind.52
Eisenhower's concept of this ideological struggle
pitted democracy against statism without assuming that the
United States and the Soviet Union were necessarily destined
to go to war.

Armed conflict was not inevitable, but the

democracies had to rise to the challenge of the Soviet
Union's increased power after the World War II. Isolationism
would keep the United States from exerting a positive
influence in world politics and would lead to Soviet
opportunism in the Third World countries.

The ultimate

50Ibid., 5.
“ Address at Banquet of International Business Machines
Corp., 14 July 1948, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
52West Virginia University Convocation, 23 September
1947, Box 195, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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result would be that the United States would be shut out of
opportunities for growth and development.53
A year later he would complement this theme of struggle
with an outline of three fundamental principles of American
life.

First, "individual freedom is our most precious asset

and the chief target of our enemies."

Second, these

personal, economic, social and political freedoms were
bundled together in an inseparable manner.
one led to the diminution of all.

Diminution of

Third, the freedom to

compete vigorously and to cooperate wholeheartedly made the
American system the most productive on earth.54
In a letter to Everett "Swede" Hazlett on 19 July 1947,
Eisenhower described his belief in the American form of
democracy.

This system, Eisenhower wrote

recognizes and protects the rights of the individual. . .
only through a system of free enterprise can this type of
democracy be preserved. . . world order can be
established only by the practice of true cooperation
among sovereign nations. . . . American leadership
towards this goal depends upon her strength-her strength
of will, her moral, social and economic strength and,
until an effective world order is achieved, upon her
military strength.55
Alongside these principles lay Eisenhower's dedication
to the "middle way."

The path to America's future led down

53Zachery Shands Davis, "Eisenhower's Worldview and
Nuclear Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia,
1989), 5.
“ Address before the American Bar Association, St.
Louis, MO, 5 September 1949, Box 193, PF, PPP, DDEL.
“ Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 40.
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the "middle of the road between unfettered power of
concentrated wealth on one flank, and the unbridled power of
statism, or partisan interest on the other."

For Eisenhower

these principles and adherence to "the middle way" provided
the setting to resolve all acute differences.56
Eisenhower also believed that intelligent people were
not isolationists and that a nation's security demanded
participation in the community of nations.

Both at home and

abroad economic aid was necessary to alleviate suffering.57
Eisenhower, like George Kennan, believed that America's
greatest strength was in its democratic institutions and its
economic power and that Communism's greatest ally was
poverty.

As he wrote in his wartime memoris: "Discontent

can be fanned into revolution, and revolution into social
chaos.

The sequel is dictatorial rule."58

Eisenhower also recognized the connection between
education and national security.

He felt strongly that the

greatest strength of the United States lay in the vitality
of its democratic institutions.

To Eisenhower college

students and university faculties represented a great wealth
of intellectual power which could be used to generate a
greater appreciation for the blessings of democracy and free
56Address before the American Bar Association, St.
Louis, MO, 5 September 1949, Box 193, PF, PPP, DDEL.
S7Allan Taylor, ed., What Eisenhower Thinks (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952), 142.
“ Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe. 505.
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enterprise.

To further this belief he played a leading part

in the forming of the American Assembly which sponsored
community forums and lectures.

He viewed the Assembly as

the "principal success of his time as university
president.1,59

Defense Policy
Eisenhower envisioned NATO as the key to European
unification, which he hoped would go beyond military to
economic and political integration.

Unity, teamwork, and

cooperation also came into play here as well; in this
instance Eisenhower saw them as the key elements in building
the political, economic, moral and military power required
to defend the free world from communist aggression and to
prevent the United States from becoming isolated in a world
dominated by nations hostile to American interests and
values.60
Eisenhower also suspected that the Soviets possessed an
advantage over the United States in being able to coordinate
their global policy and strategy without having to build
support for their policies by appealing to a large number of
internal factions and constituencies.

Only unity and

teamwork could put democracy on an equal footing with
communism in the execution of foreign policy.

Since the

59Eisenhower, At Ease. 350.
60Davis, "Eisenhower's Worldview," 159.
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United States could not contain the Communist Revolution by
bringing an end to poverty everywhere, the best remaining
option was to make the most efficient use of every resource,
human, material, and moral.61
Eisenhower's involvement with nuclear strategy from
1946 to 1952 foreshadowed his personal commitment to
implement a coherent and rational nuclear weapons strategy.
A unified strategy would control inter-service rivalry,
define the roles of each service in regard to nuclear
weapons, recognize certain domestic and foreign limitations,
and establish a relationship between ends and means.

As

Chief of Staff, President of Columbia University and Supreme
Commander of NATO, Eisenhower came to believe that the most
important missing element in the nation's political,
military, and atomic strategy was leadership.62
In a speech to the American Legion convention in New
York in August 1947 Eisenhower described the "forceful
imposition of minority dictatorial control" onto critical
areas.

The security of the United States "depends upon the

existence and growth of a free world."

The United States

must arm itself so that any war would be fought on the
territory of the "predatory aggressor."

The United States

must be ready to endure the first hard blows of the
conflict, immediately recover, and then "strike back, to hit
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid., 210.
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harder than he does— to win."

Only through genuine

preparedness could the United States convince a potential
aggressor that war would result in his exhaustion or
destruction.63

Personal Beliefs
Eisenhower believed that public office should not be
sought after, but accepted as a solemn responsibility.

He

refused to affiliate himself with a political party or to
become involved in politics "except in such exceptional
circumstances where a duty was clearly indicated."64

Yet

according to U.S. News and World Report. Eisenhower's speech
before the American Bar Association on 5 September 1951
placed him in the Republican Party even before he won its
nomination for president.

In this speech Eisenhower again

called for a political path down the center, avoiding vested
interests and increases in the power of the government.

He

depicted the center as the ideal political ground, with the
government establishing rules to preserve a practical
equality of opportunity and acting as a balance between the
forces of the right and the left.

He called upon all

63Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 44.
64Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 10 July 1951, DDEL.
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citizens to see that the government did not interfere with
Americans' lives more than is necessary.65
Eisenhower accepted the nomination to the presidency
because he judged it to be "a transcendent duty" from which
he could not retreat.

He never completely shed his distaste

for partisan politics and remained an ardent follower of the
"middle way."

His idea of teamwork and consensus allowed

him to maintain good relations with the Democratic majority
in Congress.

He found it ironic that the strongest

opposition to some of his policies came from his own
party.66

Partisanship was the antithesis of teamwork and

the unity that Eisenhower so highly prized.67

The Economy and National Defense
Eisenhower believed that the United States faced an
internal economic threat from the Soviets as well as an
external armed threat.

He could not foresee the exact

influence of the atomic bomb upon military forces, but wrote
"no matter what the nature of these forces, we simply cannot
afford extravagance.

The premiums for safety insurance must

“ "Eisenhower is a Republican," U.S. News and World
Report. 8 June 1951, 22-3.
“ Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 7 Feb 1953, DDEL.
“ Ibid., 22 March 1950.
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be paid, but they should be accurately gauged to our
needs .1168
At the Air University in April 1947, Eisenhower said
that the American way of life could be threatened
from the inside through collapse of the economic system,
through tremendous inflation of the currency, through
industrial strife, through a number of things that can
come about merely from an unbalanced budget."69
Eisenhower wrote on 27 April 1949 to Swede Hazlett that
"since a democracy must always retain a waiting,
strategicall [sic] defensive attitude, it is mandatory that
some middle line be determined between desirable strength
and unbearable cost."70
The problem of how much military power the nation could
afford before the means of protecting America began to
corrupt the "internal arrangement" of American life was a
constant source of concern to Eisenhower.

As he stated in

his diary 22 January 1952,
In time of peace, certain of these controls [censorship,
price controls, allocation of materials and commodities]
could possibly be applied in unusual and serious
circumstances, but only in the event that there are some
specific self-limiting provisions included so that shrewd
politicians cannot, through the manufacture of continuous
emergency, do permanent damage to our system.71

68Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 44.
69Speech at the Air university, Maxwell Field, Alabama,
8 April 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
70Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 54.
71Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 2 January 1952, DDEL.
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For Eisenhower the problem was how to maintain a large
armed force without breaking the American economy.

He

proposed one solution to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
in July 1950: pay a draftee only nominal pay ("nothing more
than cigarette money") and maintain a skeleton cadre who
would be remunerated along professional lines.72
Eisenhower believed in a strong and united America with
unified armed forces.

To him, "every consideration of

efficiency, economy and progress in research demands the
closest possible unity among all our fighting forces, all
the way from the bottom to the top."73

He testified before

the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had concluded
that a unified field command was a vital factor in a speedy
and decisive victory in war.

Eisenhower believed that if

the United States had attempted to fight World War II using
the theories and practices of World War I victory would have
been delayed, with untold and wasteful losses in men, money
and resources.

He wholeheartedly supported President

Truman's plan to designate a single civilian head of the
armed forces.74
72Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson, Correspondence, 31 July 1950, Box
110, Louis Johnson Papers, Alderman Library, University of
Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
73Speech at American Legion Convention, Chicago, II, 20
November 1945, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
74Testimony before the Armed Services Committee, United
States Senate, on a Bill Proposing "The National Security
Act of 1947", 25 March 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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International Outlook
Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the presidency with a
unique blend of military, diplomatic and foreign policy
experience.

He brought with him an understanding that total

war in an atomic age as an instrument of policy was
unthinkable, that an alternative to war had to be found, and
that only a system of international alliances could provide
buffers against Soviet intransigence and expansionism.75
Eisenhower spoke about peace, promoted it and believed
in peaceful co-existence with adversaries, but he saw peace
as a direct result of military, economic, and spiritual
strength.

Military strength preserved democracy; economic

strength preserved free trade and its open markets; and
spiritual strength preserved freedom of belief and
worship.76
Eisenhower thought it particularly important to provide
the public the truth about basic factors, especially the
economic dependence of the United States upon other regions
and other nations for certain types of indispensable
materials.

In December 1950, he wrote to General Lawton

Collins that the public also needed to know the great
advantage that would accrue to the Communists if they
successfully invaded Western Europe. Eisenhower pointed out
the strength that was implicit in unity and the need for
75Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 71.
76Ibid., 86.
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establishing priorities in essential tasks, since the
strength of the United States could not "carry on her back
all the rest of the world."

He went on to describe to

General Collins the relationship between national security
and the "problems at home of preparation, maintenance,
taxes, use of manpower, and production and so on."77

Prepresidential Positions
Eisenhower's prepresidential thinking on the four
specific issues of internationalism, unity, atomic weapons,
and the economy were clear. "Intelligent people are not
isolationists." "A nation's security in war and peace
demands participation in the community of nations."

In

regard to the atomic bomb, "every invention of mankind has
been capable of two uses, good and evil.

It is up to

mankind to decide to which use an invention is put.
do not believe we should bury our heads in the sand."

But I
Of

the need to help people recover from the war he said "It is
possible, even probable, that hopelessness among a people
can be a far more potent cause of war than greed."78
Foreign policy was clearly Eisenhower's first priority.
His commitment to internationalist principles was the
driving force behind his decision to seek the presidency,
77Letter to Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Department of the Army, 30 December 1950, Box 25, PF,
PPP, DDEL.
78Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
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and it remained the logical justification behind many of his
policies.

His brand of internationalism combined the

dominant view of containment held by the foreign policy
establishment in Washington with his own geopolitical
outlook.79

This outlook and his ideas on foreign policy

grew out of his belief in the efficacy of his own personal
creed of "Americanism."

This creed essentially posited

freedom as the main product of cooperation among people of
good will who sought to protect themselves from a common
danger or to achieve a common good.80
Eisenhower saw internationalism as a counter to the
advance of communism.

As he said in June 1945 in a speech

in Kansas City, "the problems of Europe and the world are
our problems, whether we like it or not."

In July 1946 in

an address at Amherst College before the American Alumni
Council Eisenhower declared "Every nation is neighbor to all
mankind. The need for international teamwork is no less than
for that among ourselves." In 1946 he said "a nation's
success in war and in peace demands participation in the
community of nations.

. . . More than this, no nation can.

79Richard Melanson, "The Foundations of Eisenhower's
Foreign Policy: Continuity, Community, and Consensus," in
Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the
Fifties, eds. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers,
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 31.
80Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
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. . attain by itself even physical security.81

In his last

remarks as Army Chief of Staff he reiterated that he firmly
believed:
the only prescription for absolute security for any
nation. . .is international understanding and
cooperation. A shining example is the international
boundary between us and our neighbors, north and
south— .But we must face the hard fact that, during the
two years since the war, the cooperative spirit has lost
ground. The world comprises two great camps, grouped on
the one side around dictatorships which subject the
individual to absolute control and, on the other,
democracy which provides him a free and unlimited
horizon....We must so gird ourselves that a predatory
aggressor will be aware of the risks he runs, should he
provoke war, it will likely be fought over his
territory.82
Eisenhower believed in the truth of Franklin's words:
"We must all hang together, or we shall assuredly hang
separately."

For him this truth was sharply underlined on

the international scene "where the future of the democracies
is dependent on their willingness to recognize their
community of interests, to assist each other to live by
their common faith in the wisdom of cooperative effort."83
On 1 February 1951, Eisenhower again said to an informal
joint session of Congress: "standing alone and isolated in a
world otherwise completely dominated by communism, our
814th of July Address, Vicksburg, Mississippi, 4 July
1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
82Speech at American Legion Convention, New York, NY,
29 August 1947, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
83Speech Accepting the "Poor Richard Club Gold Medal of
Achievement", Philadelphia, PA, 17 January 1948, Box 192,
PF, PPP, DDEL.
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system would have to wither away. We would suffer economic
atrophy and then finally collapse."84
The United Nations was the means for nations to get
along with one another. In his address at the State Fair at
Lincoln, Nebraska in September 1946, he compared the United
Nations to the Midwestern neighborhoods of his youth. "The
increase of the quality of neighborliness among nations is
as essential to national security as is an adequate
defense.1,85
These beliefs in internationalism were further
developed by his membership from January 1949 to December
1950 in a Council on Foreign Relations Group that studied
the military and political implications of the Marshall
Plan.

The council's members supported an internationalist

and an anti-isolationist position toward foreign affairs.
Eisenhower was sympathetic to the philosophy of the council
and agreed to lead the study group.

Believing that the

United States had committed a grave error by refraining from
joining the League of Nations after World war I, the Group
argued that NATO should be only one of a whole system of
American worldwide military alliances.

The study group not

only contributed to the economic and foreign policy
knowledge of the future president, but it also continued to
84Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 127.
85Address at the State Fair, Lincoln, NE, n.d.
September 1946, Box 192, PF, PPP, DDEL.
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expose him to the thinking of an elite body of
internationalists who directly influenced the conduct of
foreign affairs. Indeed, the Foreign Relations Council
itself had grown into a renowned forum for high-level,
expert discussions on international matters.86
After World War II Eisenhower participated in the major
decisions and actions that made up American foreign policy.
He approved of Truman's initial decision to continue
Roosevelt's policy of attempting to get along with the
Soviets.

When successive stages of disillusionment required

acceptance of the fact that only a determined stand against
Soviet intransigence would cope with Soviet imperialism,
Eisenhower returned to active service and spurred on the
defensive efforts of the Western allies.87
However, Eisenhower did not abandon the hope of
negotiating with the Soviets because of three elements from
his past.

The first was his service with the Control

Council in Berlin in 1945-46 which left him with a different
impression of the Soviet officials than he had expected; he
had even struck up a warm friendship with Soviet Marshall
Grigori Zhukov during a conference in Berlin.88
86Michael Wala, "An 'Education in
the Future President': the Council on
Dwight D. Eisenhower" in Reexamining
Presidency, ed. Shirley Anne Warshaw,
Press, 1993), 2-11.

The second

Foreign Affairs for
Foreign Relations and
the Eisenhower
(London: Greenwood

87Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks. 128.
88Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President. 217.
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element was his realistic appreciation for the destructive
potential of nuclear weapons as compared with the
conventional weapons of World War II.

For Eisenhower, this

made war not only irrational, but also unthinkable.

The

third factor was his commitment to a major reduction in
defense expenditures.89
On 21 June 1951 while assigned as commander of Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Eisenhower
described for Swede Hazlett his insistence on a system of
collective security in which he saw Europe providing in the
long run for its own defense.

The United States would help

the Europeans produce arms and units for its own defense,
with the United States providing psychological, intellectual
and material leadership.90

On 4 September 1951 Eisenhower

outlined a requirement for a "broad and intelligent program
of loans, trade, technical assistance and mutual guarantees
of security."91
Unless we are careful to build up and to maintain a great
group of international friends ready to trade with us,
where do we hope to get the materials that we will one
day need as our rate of consumption continues and
accelerates?92
Eisenhower's internationalist position was reflected in
his choice of business and social associates.

Between 1945

89Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 56.
9CGriffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. 85.
91Ibid., 166.
92Ibid., 167.
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and 1952, almost without exception Eisenhower's business
companions were internationalists, who advocated an expanded
global political, economic and military role for the United
States, and conservatives who desired to rein in the growing
power and activism of the state.

His own version of

patriotic nationalism and his distaste for divisive class
and partisan warfare blended well with their convictions.
He would increasingly call upon them for counsel and
political support.93
Attorney General Herbert Brownell later wrote that
Eisenhower's entire career prepared him for the presidency.
He had developed a detailed knowledge of the Far East under
MacArthur; he developed the Army budget and presented it to
Congress.

He had learned the relationship between the

Pentagon budget and the general economic welfare of the
United States.

Eisenhower knew on a first name basis most

of the leaders of the legislative branch who carried over
into his own administration.

Eisenhower, moreover, had

helped develop postwar policy toward Europe.

As a

presidential candidate, he was not handicapped by a
strong partisan background, nor was he brought up in
the log-rolling atmosphere of Congress or in any State
House.94

93Burk, DDE: Hero and Politician. 102-103.
94Thompson, Eleven Intimate Perspectives. 165-6.
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Summary
Eisenhower brought to the presidency certain intangible
but crucial assets.
militarist.

A lifetime soldier, he was no

The leader of a victorious coalition in the

greatest war in history, he was genuinely a man of peace.
His own high rank and long military experience made it
impossible for the Pentagon brass to overshadow him; he
handled them as no big business man, corporate executive or
politician could.

He had justifiable confidence in his one

great gift— a gift of getting along with people, of solving
and smoothing over organizational problems.

Though his

faith in the idea that he could sit down and talk with
Soviet leaders reflected an overestimation of his skills in
dealing with people, it indicated a willingness to assume
that there were human beings with similar problems on the
other side.

For the first time since FDR, America had a

leader who was not afraid to negotiate.95
In foreign affairs, Eisenhower believed that he was the
only person who could continue the national consensus
established by Roosevelt on domestic and foreign policy.
American involvement in Korea endangered this consensus as
the war became the chief symbol of an increasingly
frustrating Cold War.96

He accepted the support of the

95I.F. Stone, The Haunted Fifties (Boston, Little,
Brown, 1963), 105.
"Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 16.
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Republican Party's internationalist wing in a contest
against Senator Robert A. Taft, the favorite of the
isolationist wing.

The more moderate Republicans interested

in preserving the foreign policy consensus convinced him
that he would be carrying out his NATO assignment in a
different way, since only he could forestall the nomination
of Senator Taft and the coming to power of his neo
isolationist backers.

Eisenhower also saw his role as

president as the continuation of his roles at SHAEF and at
NATO as the great unifier and as the leader of the Western
democracies in war and peace.97
The American public identified Eisenhower as a
successful military leader, a common, down-to-earth
individual, and a humble, non-political man.

This picture

merged with that of the peaceful warrior and duty-bound
seeker of consensus.

He became a hero because he was one;

he became a hero because he was not a warrior or a pacifist,
a leader or a common man, a candidate or a or a politician,
but because he was all of these things.

He offered an

insecure people experience, strength, and confidence.98
General Eisenhower approached the presidency of
Columbia University in June 1947, his appointment as NATO
commander in December 1950, and his drive for the Republican
97Ibid., 17.
"Richard E. Crable, "Ike: Identification, Argument,
and Paradoxical Appeal," Quarterly Journal of Speech 63
(1977), 195.
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presidential nomination in January 1952 in the same manner.
He had been called to duty; his position was clear: he
expected full support and he would continue to keep his
options open.

He had convinced himself that "acceptance was

a duty."99
"Travis Beal Jacobs, "Eisenhower, the American
Assembly, and the 1952 Elections," in Warshaw, Reexamining
the Eisenhower Presidency. 18-19.
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CHAPTER 5
FROM A LONG TELEGRAM TO A NEW LOOK
The previous chapters in this study examined the prepresidential dispositions of both Harry S. Truman and Dwight
D. Eisenhower.

This chapter will consider the impact of

their character traits, personal beliefs and backgrounds on
the foreign policy and national security problems of their
respective administrations.

Each man faced the same

essential dilemma: how to counter the Soviet threat while
meeting the domestic and political demands of his era.

Each

president modified the foreign policy of his predecessor in
order to meet the demands of the unique situation
confronting his administration.

The major documents which

resulted from the presidential reviews of national security
and foreign policy, Truman's NSC 68 and Eisenhower’s NSC
162, show how each president altered foreign and national
security policy to meet the demands of his philosophy during
his time in the arena.

President Harry S. Truman
During World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt
minimized disagreements between the United States and the
Soviet Union and emphasized cooperation.

Roosevelt was

98

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99
convinced that his primary obligation was to focus the
attention of the American people upon winning the war and to
avoid controversies which might jeopardize national unity.1
Roosevelt wanted to keep the Soviets involved in the war
effort and to prevent a negotiated peace at the w a r ’s end
which might replicate the problems which had followed World
War I.

Roosevelt dispatched a personal emissary, W. Averell

Harriman, to the Soviet Union soon after it entered the war
to resolve some early misunderstandings.2
During the war itself Roosevelt implemented a strategy
of co-opting the Soviets by involving them in a series of
conferences and in the development of an organization to
maintain peace in the post-war world.

Roosevelt believed

that these joint planning activities would build a
cooperative relationship between the two powers, would
assure the Soviets of security and acceptability in the
international arena, and would place moral pressures on the
Soviets to live by the rules of the organization which they
helped to create.3

This strategy of co-opting the Soviets

also involved postponing discussion of any issues which
might be potentially divisive.
Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1946), 18.
2W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to
Churchill and Stalin (New York: Random House, 1975), 268.
3Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the
Origins of McCarthvism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972),
38.
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Divisions eventually surfaced, however, and President
Roosevelt's last days in office were marked by almost open
disagreements with the Soviets.

The question was whether

these disagreements would become permanent after the war.
President Harry S Truman, realizing the importance of
domestic political considerations and desirous of continuing
Roosevelt's co-operative policies, did not rush into a
protracted confrontation with the Soviets while he and his
country were preoccupied with demobilization and returning
the nation to peacetime.4 As president, Truman would
frequently rely upon his reservoir of historical knowledge
as a guide to action in areas in which he had little
experience, such as foreign affairs.

He saw the 1940s as a

potential replay of the 1930s - depression, aggression,
totalitarianism, and war.5

For Truman the 1930s taught a

plain and unmistakable lesson: appeasement did not eliminate
the possibility of war.
lessons.

Other periods taught similar

The withdrawal of American troops from Korea in

1949 suggested to Truman the eagerness of his Southern
ancestors for the end of Reconstruction.

The 1950 North

Korean invasion of South Korea brought to Truman's mind not
only America's rescue of the Allies in 1917, but also
Washington's recovery in Valley Forge.6
4Ferrell, "HST: A Chance President," 160.
5Paterson, On Every Front. 128.
6May, "Lessons" of the Past. 80.
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But which analogy provided the best guide for relations
with the USSR?

Truman's advisors urged the president to be

as firm as possible in his dealings with the Soviets.
Ambassador W. Averell Harriman was convinced that the United
States should indicate its displeasure in ways that affected
the Soviet interest in each case in which they failed to
take the interests of the United States into
consideration.7

The State Department agreed, writing that

the United States should make it "patently clear" that
cooperation and aid depended on the Soviet1s conformity to
the principles agreed upon at the Moscow and Teheran
Conferences and that "firmness, friendliness and positive
action" may be able to make them drop "at least the most
odious methods of interference in the internal affairs of
other countries."8
President Truman, who most admired the tough, plainspeaking leaders of America's past, implemented this advice
when he met with V. I. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister,
on 22 and 23 April 22 1945.

This meeting had been arranged

to demonstrate the continued cooperative spirit between the
two governments and to reduce the disturbances which had
been caused by the death of President Roosevelt.9 Mr.
Truman began the meeting by saying that he stood squarely
7FRUS. 1945 5:822.
8Ibid., 1944 4:817.
9Ibid., 1945 5:828.
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behind President Roosevelt's commitments and agreements and
brought the Soviets to task for not carrying out their
portion of the agreement made in the Crimea.

Truman

believed that the agreements made at Yalta for free
elections were in fact contracts and resolved to hold the
Soviets to their word.

According to Charles E. Bohlen,

Assistant to the Secretary of State, Mr Truman declared
"with great firmness" that the Soviets had reached an
agreement on Poland and that it only remained for Marshall
Stalin to carry it out in accordance with his word.10

When

Molotov complained of his treatment, Truman countered,
"Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like
that."11

President Truman was getting tough with the

Soviets just as Senator Truman had gotten tough with
contractors and government agencies who had failed to live
up to agreements.

This firm, judicial tone, reflecting

Truman's belief in the sanctity of previously made
agreements and the necessity of keeping one's word, made it
known to the Soviets that United States-Soviet relations
were now to be conducted in a different manner.
President Truman had his first meeting with Stalin at
the Potsdam Conference and was to come away from it
convinced that "force is the only thing the Russians
10Ibid., 257.
“ Maddox, From War to Cold Wa r . 55.
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understand."12

The conference settled some issues, but the

chief significance for Truman was the opportunity to meet
with Stalin and the Soviets and to see what the West had to
face in the future.

Events of the succeeding months, which

saw continuing disagreements between the two countries, only
reinforced Truman's belief that a more confrontational
policy was necessary.
At the same time, policy makers in the State Department
perceived that Eastern Europe was coming more and more under
the influence of the Soviets.

Harriman viewed the Soviets'

plans to establish satellite states in the region as a
threat to the world and the United States.13

Recent Soviet

successes in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania
seemed to be aimed at the Mediterranean and the oil-rich
Middle East.

Truman's foreign policy planners saw only

Greece, Turkey and Iran separating the Soviets from these
resources.

United States' planners also knew that each of

these nations was extremely susceptible to the Soviet
tactics of subversion and espionage.14
In his first State of the Union Address on 21 January
1946, President Truman declared that his postwar foreign
policy sought to build a peace based on the tenets of
12Truman, Memoirs. 1:412.
13FRUS, 1945 5:843.
14Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The
Viking Press, 1955), 68.
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understanding and justice.

This was not a break with the

policies of the Roosevelt administration, nor was it a new
policy.

Clearly Truman, always the centrist, had grasped

the political mean between repudiation and accommodation.
Truman's rather understated position was followed in
February by Stalin's political address to the Supreme Soviet
in which he defined Communist postwar goals and strategies
for the Soviet Union.

For Stalin there could be no long-

range cooperation between communism and capitalism.

The war

itself had been the result of convulsions in the capitalist
system.

As a pro forma candidate for election to the

Supreme Soviet, Stalin declared that the world revolution
would continue and that the Soviet Union would embark on a
series of five-year plans to press on with the revolutionary
program.15
Stalin's speech was at first greeted with little
surprise and without much concern by Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes who had, at the Moscow meetings in October
1945, continued to look for common ground between the United
States and the Soviet Union.16

Truman's other advisors who

had consistently argued for a harder line vis-a-vis the
Soviets had a different reaction.

The speech convinced

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that there was no way
15New York Times. 10 February 1946, 4:24.
“ Phillips, The Truman Presidency. 258.
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in which democracy and communism could co-exist.17
Ambassador Averell Harriman also saw Stalin's words as the
emergence of a hard, new party line that proved the futility
of counting upon Soviet cooperation in settling the
political affairs of postwar Europe.18

Undersecretary of

State Dean Acheson viewed the speech as an affirmation of a
Soviet offensive against the West which Stalin had started
in Poland in 1945.19

Later Secretary Byrnes himself was to

use Stalin's words in his own speeches calling for a firmer
attitude toward the Soviets.20
In February 1946 George Kennan, the charge d'affaires
in Moscow, in response to a Washington query, described the
expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union in his now
famous "Long Telegram."21

Kennan, the State Department's

foremost Soviet expert, warned that the Soviet Union
constituted a political force "committed fanatically" to the
belief that there could be no modus vivendi with the United
States.

The Soviets believed that they had to destroy the

internal harmony and stability of the United States and that
17Walter Millis and E.S. Duffield, eds., The Forrestal
Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 135.
18Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and
Stalin. 547.
19Acheson, Present At The Creation. 194.
20James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1947), 255.
21FRUS. 1946 6:696-709.
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they had to break its international authority.22

Kennan

predicted that the Soviets would use every possible means to
infiltrate, divide and weaken the West.

Seeking a modus

vivendi with the Soviets would only lead to political
warfare.

Later in March Kennan characterized the belief,

held by some prominent Americans, that Soviet suspicions of
the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc could be ameliorated as
a serious misunderstanding about Soviet realities.

This

constituted the "most insidious and dangerous single error
Americans could make thinking about by the Soviet Union."23
President Truman had been inching to the same position,
complaining to Secretary Byrnes on 5 January 1946 that "I'm
tired of babying the Soviets."24

Truman and the foreign

policy establishment seized upon Kennan's message.

The

United States at large slowly responded to Kennan's
recommendations.25

Truman1s approach was later dubbed the

strategy of containment after Kennan's recommendation that
the growth of Soviet influence had to be contained.
Later during 1946, controversies over Soviet activities
in Iran, Greece and Turkey broke out between the United
States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, attempting to

wring oil concessions from the Iranians, armed and supported
22Ibid., 704.
23Ibid., 710.
24Truman, Memoirs. 1:552.
“ Acheson, Present At The Creation. 151.
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a revolutionary government in the northern Iranian province
of Azerbaijan.

In Turkey Stalin demanded the return of

three border provinces which Russia had lost after World War
I.

He also demanded bases on the Dardanelles and in Greek

Thrace and the revision of the international convention
which governed passage of ships through the Black Sea
Straits.

The War Department characterized these activities

and incidents as evidence of the determination of the
Soviets to dominate the eastern Mediterranean.

In June the

Soviet Union launched a propaganda offensive against the
United States to convince the world that the United States
had deserted Roosevelt's foreign policy in favor of a
militarist, imperialist and expansionist foreign policy.26
In August 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed
their concern over the world situation.

If the Soviets

succeeded in dominating Turkey and controlling the Turkish
Straits, the military situation in the Middle East and the
Eastern Mediterranean could become untenable for the other
nations.

The Joint Chiefs saw a calculated Soviet policy of

expanding Soviet "de facto geographical and political
control.1127
Signs of increased Communist assistance to Greek
leftists continued to appear and, in the eyes of the West,
continued to threaten the stability of that country.

In

26FRUS. 1946 6:768-69.
27FRUS, 1946 7:857-8.
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October 1946, the American Military Attache in Greece,
Lieutenant Colonel Alan C. Miller reported that "movement of
Left Wing bands across the frontier is given the tacit
approval of Yugoslav and Albanian authorities.1,28

The

State Department believed that "there can be no question
that the U.S.S.R. is providing military assistance to
elements seeking to cause the fall of the Greek
Government."29

A 1947 United Nations Security Council

investigation confirmed suspicions that Albania, Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia had previously supported guerrilla warfare in
Greece in 1945 and 1946.30

Great Britain meanwhile was

becoming increasingly concerned over her ability to maintain
financial support of the beleaguered Greeks.31

Truman with

his historical perspective must have seen all of this as a
variation of the totalitarian aggression of the 1930s.
Meanwhile foreign affairs appeared to be of little
concern to the Republicans.

In a radio address on 3 January

1947, Senator Taft, a leading isolationist, devoted only
three paragraphs to foreign affairs.

In these paragraphs he

specifically predicted congressional resistance to foreign
aid and tariff reductions.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg,

28Ibid., 230-2.
29Ibid., 243.
30Ibid., 1947 5:850.
31Lawrence S. Wittner, American Intervention in Greece.
1943-49 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 64.
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Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a
convert to internationalism, promised not only continued
support of the Administration's foreign policy program, but
also close examination of any proposed legislation dealing
with international trade and reductions in tariffs.32
Truman would have to battle isolationism again, just as
he had while a member of the Senate.

In addition,

increasing inflation, high unemployment and an economy
looking to expand confronted the president.

In 1946, the

consumer price index had increased from 129.6 to 153.3 while
the wholesale price index rose from 107.1 to 140.9.33
Truman's background as a county administrator and
politician, as well as his experience with balanced budgets,
made it hard for him to justify increased spending on
assistance to foreign countries while constituents faced
economic difficulties at home.
Nonetheless, in his State of the Union Address on 6
January 1947 President Truman remained true to both reform
and internationalism.

He outlined his legislative program,

warning against the complete dismantling of the New Deal,
stressing a balanced budget and a large-scale housing
program.

In the area of foreign affairs he expressed his

confidence that a bipartisan approach to foreign policy
32New York Times. 20 January 1947, 1.
33Susan Hartman, Truman and the 80th Congress
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 4.
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would continue, and he advocated the same free trade
position he had embraced as a senator.34
Six weeks later Great Britain officially notified the
United States that she would pull out of Greece by 1 April
1947.

Recent dispatches from Greece stressed the urgency of

the situation: Greece needed substantial aid quickly if the
communist rebels were not to take her over.

If the West

lost Greece, then Turkey's position would become
untenable.35
President Truman decided that the United States had
only one real alternative in the matter.

If Greece and

Turkey were to fall under the control of the Soviet Union,
communist domination threatened freedom and liberty
throughout the world.

Realizing that he faced a Republican-

controlled Congress and fearing a revival of isolationism,
Truman determined to use the spirit of bipartisan support of
foreign policy which Senator Vandenberg had pledged in
January to support aid to Greece.
On the morning of February 27, President Truman held a
meeting with Senators Styles Bridges, Arthur Vandenberg,
Alben Barkley and Tom Connally and Congressmen Joseph
Martin, Charles Eaton, Sol Bloom and Sam Rayburn.

Truman

34U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Offce of the Federal
Register. National Archives and records Service, 1963),
Harry S. Truman, 1947, 9-12. (Hereafter cited as Public
Papers. Truman.)
35FRUS, 1947 5:56.
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explained to them the position in which the British
withdrawal had placed the United States.

Secretary of State

George C. Marshall reviewed the details of the situation and
made it clear that the United States faced the choice of
taking action to prevent a communist takeover in Greece or
losing Greece and Turkey by doing nothing.36

After Dean

Acheson made an impassioned plea for congressional support,
to the effect that the United States had arrived at a
position "without parallel since ancient history," the
leading legislators finally appreciated the threat.37
Senator Vandenberg urged the president to make a personal
appearance before Congress and "scare hell" out of the
country.

"If you will say that to the Congress and the

country, I will support you and I believe that most of the
members will do the same."38
At one o'clock in the afternoon on Wednesday, 12 March
1947 President Truman addressed a joint session of Congress
on what he described as an extremely critical situation.

As

recalled by Eben A. Ayers39,
the President went before Congress at one o'clock today
and delivered. . . an address calling for $400 million to
be provided for aid to Greece and for authority to
furnish civilian and military personnel. The great
importance and significance of the speech lies less in
36Jones, The Fifteen Weeks. 139.
37Ibid., 142.
38Acheson, Present At The Creation. 219.
39Eben A. Ayers was Truman's Assistant Press Secretary.
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the recommendations than in the break which it marks in
U. S. foreign policy and in its attack upon the communist
policy of political infiltration in foreign countries and
its sharp and clear references to Russia. The president
did not name "Russia" or the Soviets at any point but his
words were clear. They marked the end of appeasement of
Russia.40
The president, without mentioning the Soviet Union,
referred to the struggle between two systems of government,
one advocating self-determination and the other advocating
totalitarian rule.

He saw Greece and Turkey standing in the

front line of the democracies; their fall would be
devastating to the cause of freedom.

"I believe that it

must be the policy of the United States to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures."41
The president's address initially met with immediate
criticism from a broad spectrum of public opinion.
Columnist Walter Lippman wrote that the United States was
not rich enough or strong enough to subsidize reaction to
communist advances all over the world.

Liberals were

especially hostile as they saw the address as an invitation
to war.

Public opinion polls revealed that 56% of the

public favored aid to Greece, but only 45% favored sending
military advisors or bypassing the United Nations.

Bernard

40Eben A. Ayers, Truman In The White House (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1991), 170.
41Public Papers. Truman. 176-179.
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Baruch noted that the address was almost a declaration of
ideological war.42
The New Republic maintained that the United States
would justify its use of a system of unholy alliances on the
basis that the end justified the means.
has "summoned in a century of fear."43

President Truman
The immediate

effect was to divide Europe into "irreconcilable camps of
good and evil" and to establish the United States as the
guardian of the status quo.44

A positive reaction to the

speech was evident, however.

The New York Times declared on

12 March 1947 that a new chapter in foreign policy more
appropriate to the position of the United States was being
opened, and that the "epoch of isolation and occasional
intervention is ended" and is "being replaced by an epoch of
responsibility."45

On the 13th the New York Times would

follow up by stating that it believed that "there can be no
doubt that the American people stand behind this
warning."46

President Truman in his Memoirs wrote that it

was a turning point in American foreign policy.47
42New Republic. 31 March 1947, 5.
43Ibid., 24 March 1947, 13.
44Public Papers. Truman. 176-79.
45New York Times. 12 March 1947.
46Ibid, 13 March 1947.
47Truman, Memoirs; Years of Trial and Hope. 230.
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Deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union caused
two strains of opinion to develop about the long term
response of the United States.

These strains mirrored

Truman's own struggle with the primacy of strength and
preparedness versus the importance of economic development
in world affairs.

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal

recommended a stronger national defense to thwart an armed
confrontation with the Soviets.

Secretary of State George

C. Marshall, on the other hand, favored concentrating on the
problems of Europe's economic recovery.

Forrestal saw the

United States's monopoly of the atomic bomb as the key to
its postwar security, while Marshall saw the restoration of
the European balance of power as the guarantor of American
security.48
Indeed, in June 1947 President Truman attempted to
satisfy both sets of demands by launching the European
Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan, shortly
after the Truman Doctrine was announced to counter a shift
in the correlation of power from the United States towards
the Soviet Union.

These measures were followed by the

National Defense Act of 1947.

This act created a host of

new agencies, including the National Security Council (NSC)
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

While these

agencies reflected Truman's sense of efficiency and order,
4BSteven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American
Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 9-10.
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the newly created Department of Defense (DOD) demonstrated
the President's thoughts on unifying the military services
to reduce duplication and division of authority.
Additionally the creation of the NSC unified and integrated
defense and foreign policy, matching military capabilities
with diplomatic commitments, and reconciling national
security requirements with the needs of the domestic
economy.49

The creation of the NSC reflects Truman’s

desire to overcome the inadequacies of initial planning and
the delay in determining basic policy he had seen in the
Executive Branch as a senator.
Yet the influence of the Soviet Union and its ability
to threaten the West continued.

More ominously, in

September 1949 an Air Force intelligence aircraft brought
back evidence that the Soviet Union had successfully
detonated an atomic device.50

President Truman had

previously decided that balancing the budget was his primary
concern in the face of postwar inflation and a swollen
budget.

While he authorized a request for a $3 billion

supplemental military appropriation for Fiscal Year 1949,
Truman's budgets gave priority to domestic obligations and
left the remainder to the Department of Defense in keeping
with his belief that large defense expenditures would
49Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. 176.
50Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 14.
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bankrupt the nation.51

In early December 1948 Truman

approved a defense budget of $14.4 billion for FY 1950.
Secretary Forrestall and the Joint Chiefs, unable to
convince Truman of the need for additional resources, argued
that only nuclear weapons would combine a frugal approach to
defense expenditures with a credible military stance.
Before committing himself to this program Truman
ordered his secretaries of State and Defense to "undertake a
re-examination of our objectives in peace and war and of the
effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in

light

of the probable fission bomb capability and possible
thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union."52

This

review would result in a significant change in the United
States' policy of containment.
United States officials, operating under the philosophy
of the "Long Telegram," had previously seen the chief

threat

to the balance of power as political and economic, not
military; wartime devastation and natural calamities had so
disrupted life in Europe that Communist parties in France,
Italy, Greece and elsewhere were thought to have excellent
opportunities of coming to power through coups or even
through free elections.

United States policy from 1947 to

1949 attempted to revive faith in democratic institutions
and procedures in order to preempt further expansion by
51Ibid., 11.
52FRUS, 1950 1:141-42.
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communist parties.

However, fears of inflation and the

effect of unbalanced budgets limited the primary application
of American power to Europe while attempts were made to
minimize involvement in other areas like China and
Palestine.53
The Administration had relied on its monopoly of atomic
weapons to keep the defense budget under $15 billion while
it countered Soviet advances with economic aid.

The

administration had assumed that the threat to use atomic
weapons would be sufficient to keep the Soviets from
overrunning Western Europe.

News that the Soviets had

detonated their own bomb in August 1949 signalled that the
United States atomic deterrent would not last.

Truman's

contemplation of the development of the hydrogen bomb was an
attempt to regain nuclear superiority in order to avoid
having to match Soviet troop levels in Europe.

Economic aid

without military involvement would no longer suffice to
contain Soviet advances.54

Moreover, the decision required

a general examination of the country's "strategic plans and
its objectives in peace and war."55
On 12 April 1950 Truman referred the results of this
policy review by the Departments of State and Defense
53John Lewis Gaddis, "Was The Truman Doctrine A Real
Turning Point?" Foreign Affairs 53 (January 1974), 391-2.
54Ibid., 393-4.
55FRUS, 1950 1:236.
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Department to the National Security Council for
consideration and a determination of its implications.

The

final document, NSC 68, was to provide the basis for
increasing the defense budget, and the producing and
stockpiling thermonuclear weapons.56
This improvement of the country's defenses under NSC 68
was aimed at achieving the fundamental objective of assuring
the survival of the United States under a non-totalitarian
form of government.

The chief function served by NSC 68 was

to give the national defense a claim on resources equal to
or greater than that of all other competing government
programs.

This was a complete break with the past policy

and was necessitated by the administration's understanding
of the Soviet threat and the role of the United States as
world leader.57
The justification for higher defense expenditures was
needed as Truman Administration planners had became
increasingly concerned over the strategic implications of
the Soviet atomic bomb.

NSC 68 was the nation's first

formal statement of national security policy.

It assumed

that the Soviets aspired to worldwide hegemony, did not rule
out the possibility of war, and showed how a global policy
56John M. Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal," Naval War
College Review 33 (June 1980), 4-5.
57Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 34.
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of resisting communism could be implemented without
bankrupting the United States.58
NSC 68 estimated that the U.S.S.R. would attain a first
strike capability which could seriously damage vital centers
in the United States by 1954, unless faced by a more
effective level of opposition.59

The paper contained four

possible courses of action, the first of which was staying
the present course and continuing present policies.

The

other three courses included a return to isolation, a
preventive war and a rapid buildup of political, economic,
and military strength in the Free World.

The Truman

Administration chose the fourth course of action and placed
the United States firmly on the road of active military
opposition to Soviet military advances.60
NSC 68 asserted that the American people would support
national security demands upon scarce economic and social
resources where traditionally it had placed domestic needs
and interests before those of national security.

NSC 68

also ushered in an era in which the United States departed
from previous practice and maintained sizable military
forces, placing an increased reliance upon military power as
an element of foreign policy.61
58Gaddis, "The Truman Doctrine A Turning Point?" 395-6.
59FRUS, 1950 1:251.
60Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Reappraisal," 10-11.
“ Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 4.
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This change in American foreign policy occurred because
the Truman Administration went beyond the basic tenets of
Kennan's "Long Telegram," which saw the Soviet threat as one
chiefly economic and political in nature.

Up to this time

the Truman Administration had counted upon its atomic
monopoly to counter the Soviet manpower advantage in Europe.
With the detonation of the Soviet's own atomic bomb, the
Administration believed a new approach to containment was
required.

Where Kennan assumed that containment of the

Soviet Union in time would produce internal changes that
would eventually alter Soviet behavior,62

Truman and his

advisors now saw an almost interminable military threat from
an implacable enemy armed with atomic weapons.

NSC 68

described the Cold War as a more or less permanent state of
relations between the United States and the Soviets.63

NSC

68 also provided a statement of goals and methods to insure
that the United States and its allies could withstand the
Soviet Union.64
NSC 68 reaffirmed the contention of the "Long Telegram"
that the Soviet Union aspired to global hegemony.65

The

United States faced an unavoidable conflict with the Soviet
62X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs
25 (July 1947): 574-76.
“ Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 21.
64Ibid., 8.
“ FRUS, 1946 6:696-709.
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Union, because it opposed the Soviet Union and its objective
of world domination.

NSC 68 also estimated that the Soviet

Union would have the hydrogen bomb and a delivery means by
1954, thus significantly offsetting US nuclear capability.
It also ruled out the prospect of arms control and
negotiations with the Soviet Union from anything except a
position of strength.

NSC 68 finished with a strong call

for a much greater commitment of United States resources to
national security in order to overcome the chief limitations
of American power, a lack of conventional military forces
and the military and economic weaknesses of Europe.66
When the attack on Korea came a few months later,
Truman, seeing the events of the 1930s repeating themselves
in the North Korean invasion of South Korea, rallied the
United Nations, endorsed NSC 68 and asked the services to
tell him what they needed from Congress in the way of
supplemental appropriations.

With the country at war and

almost everyone assuming that the Russians were the puppetmasters of the North Koreans, congressmen of both parties
voted to give the president whatever he asked.67
66Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy
Management: A study in Defense Politics (Lexington, KE.: The
University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 6-7.
67Ernest R. May, "The American Commitment to Germany,
1949-1955," in American Historians and the Atlantic
Alliance, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan, (Kent, OH: The Kent State
University Press, 1991), 61.
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On 30 September 1950, President Truman signed NSC 68 as
the feeling developed in the administration that the Soviet
Union was behind the war.

The growing unpopularity of the

war, however, and the expense of the buildup cost Truman and
his party the White House as the country elected a successor
who promised to "go to Korea."68
Harry Truman made a difference as President of the
United States because he brought the clear, simple blackand-white view of a judge to bear upon international
politics.

Where Roosevelt put off decisions, Truman

relished the opportunity to make them just as he had as a
presiding judge in Jackson County.

For Truman the code of

the politician was at the bottom of personal relations: one
honored previously made agreements or one was not worthy of
trust in the future.

For a president unskilled in foreign

affairs, history provided a guide to the future.

Truman's

ancestors taught him that no half-hearted measures would
suffice in defense of hearth and home.

A threat either

existed at a fairly specific time or one did not exist.
Moreover, NSC 68 had the appearance of a legal brief to
obtain a decision from a former county judge.

The Transition from Truman to Eisenhower
By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Truman in
the presidency, the first practitioners of the containment
68Rearden, The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. 30.
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policy could point to both successes and failures.

The

Soviets had not expanded any further in Europe, but a war,
supported by both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists,
was underway in Korea.

On 18 November 1952 when Truman and

his staff briefed General Eisenhower on the state of the
military and foreign affairs the new administration would
face, an array of problems greeted the new administration:
- Korea: the achievement of a truce depended upon
resolving the issue of forcible repatriation of prisonersof-war.
- Iran: the Communists threatened to exploit a crisis
over Iranian confiscation of British oil properties.
- Indochina: the United States was financially
supporting a colonialist French government whose policies
made it impossible to rally the local population to oppose
communist forces effectively.
- Foreign aid: the question concerned how much aid, how
should it be allocated between military and economic aid,
and to whom should it be given.69
When Truman had measured the extent of the SovietAmerican problem in 1947, he had been able to do it with the
knowledge of American superiority.

He was able to

counterbalance the Soviet superiority in ground forces with
the American monopoly in atomic weapons and delivery
systems.

Truman was certain that this approach had

69Rostow. The United States In the World Arena. 263.
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prevented the disintegration of Western Europe and its
subsequent passage into the Communist sphere and allowed him
to establish his "Fair Deal" while keeping the Soviets at
bay.

Six years later, however, the Communists had emerged

as the strongest military power in Asia.

Nationalism had

spread throughout Asia and the Middle East, creating
problems difficult in their own right, but of great effect
on the Western Alliance.

The United States and the Soviet

Union now opposed each other with both the weapons of mass
destruction on the one hand and the techniques of
propaganda, economic aid and nonmilitary influence on the
other.70

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Eisenhower, who came to the presidency with a wealth of
foreign policy and administrative experience, brought with
him an understanding that total war in an atomic age was
unthinkable, that an alternative to war had to found, and
that only a system of international alliances could provide
buffers against Soviet intransigence and expansionism.71
Eisenhower saw the re-establishment of fiscal
responsibility as an essential prerequisite to a sound
defense.

He saw big government as a threat to free

enterprise and individual endeavor, which his value system
70Ibid., 264.
71Medhurst, DDE; Strategic Communicator. 71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125
regarded as the core elements of American democracy.

He

feared that a constantly expanding military budget would
eventually lead to an excessive level of federal
intervention to channel national resources into defense.
The result would be a garrison state in which high taxes,
monetary restrictions and economic controls would cripple
private enterprise.72

This concern for the ability of the

United States to sustain the Cold War was at the root of his
concern about the nation's economic health.

The nation

could only combat communism if it were economically
healthy.73
As president, Eisenhower was as convinced in 1953 as he
had been in the late 40s that the United States had to stand
as the bulwark against Soviet expansionism and the
establishment of new Soviet regimes.

During his years with

NATO he had refined his commitment to the fundamentals of
containment, adding to his geopolitical analysis a new
emphasis on the United States' need for trading partners.
The United States' economy could not succeed if it became
isolated from the foreign markets and raw materials it
required overseas.74

These questions of economic health

72Iwan W. Morgan, "Eisenhower and the Balanced Budget,"
in Warshaw, Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency. 121-122.
73Ibid., 123.
74Louis Galambos, "Forward" in Warshaw, Reexamining the
Eisenhower Presidency, viii.
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were always interwoven closely with the central elements of
United States foreign policy.75
Eisenhower had little training in domestic affairs, but
he possessed a broad background in international matters.
World War II served as his point of reference in world
affairs.

He derived his rejection of postwar isolationism

and appeasement from his experience during the war.

His

basic principles for conducting United States' foreign
policy grew out of his wartime experience: the United States
must make no major move without the support of key allies,
and the President must undertake no major initiative
overseas without the explicit support of Congress.76
Eisenhower's self-portrait, Crusade in Europe (1948),
opened with the theme of cooperation which would run through
the entire work and which would characterize his
administration.

This theme would be linked with related

terms such as unity, teamwork, allies, and partnership.

The

picture which emerged was that of a leader who believed that
the greatest safety lay in numbers and the soundest wisdom
in a variety of voices.77

In Eisenhower's view the very

reason for being a military officer was to preserve, protect
and defend the United States and its values.

For him the

75Ibid., x.
76Anthony James Joes, "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Tide
Comes In." Presidential Studies Quarterly. 15 (Summer 1985):
567.
77Medhurst, DDE: Strategic Communicator. 13.
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defense of his country assumed an almost religious nature.
In his moral scheme, the ends counted; words and actions
were means only.

He would take any measure to defeat the

enemy or to protect his country.78

These sentiments would

be visible in his foreign policy and in the activities of
his administration, particularly in his use of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Eisenhower spoke about peace, promoted it and believed
in peaceful co-existence with adversaries, but he saw peace
as a direct result of military, economic, and spiritual
strength.

Military strength preserved democracy; economic

strength preserved free trade and its open markets;
spiritual strength preserved freedom of belief and
worship.79

He was constantly aware of the link between

political and economic vitality and the costs of military
commitments overseas and the expense of maintaining a large
peacetime military establishment.80
The newly elected president considered himself an
expert in national security affairs and brought definite
ideas on the management of national security to his
presidency, chief of which was the necessity of aligning the
defense budget to the well-being of the country's economy.
To this end he intended to limit defense spending based on a
78Ibid.
79Ibid., 86.
"Davis, Soldier of Democracy. 204.
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realistic appraisal of the cost of maintaining an adequate,
but not extravagant national defense over an extended period
of time.

Eisenhower developed this "new look" at security

policy in order to construct a viable alternative strategy
to what he saw as Truman1s too costly method of implementing
the national policy of containment.61
One of Eisenhower's first steps in this "new look" was
to reorganize the presidency based on his experiences as a
military planner and organizer.

For years he had been in

contact with the White House and had certain ideas about the
"system, or lack or system, under which it operated."
was almost affronted by its lack of organization.

He

"With my

training in problems involving organization, it was
inconceivable that the work of the White House could not be
better systemized [sic]."

Eisenhower worked through three

principal agencies: the Cabinet, the National Security
Council, and the Office of Budget.

While he used these

agencies to plan and execute his policies, he retained
ultimate responsibility and remained fully in charge.82
His acceptance of this principle harkens back to when he was
81Cole Christian Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez: A
Reappraisal of Presidential Activism and Crisis Management"
(Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1983), 13.
82Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 589.
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prepared to bear full responsibility if the D-Day landings
in Europe had failed.83
Eisenhower was in broad agreement with the policy of
containment, but not at the expense of the economic health
of the United States.

If the United States spent itself

into insolvency, the Soviets would win the war without
firing a shot.

Eisenhower, as president, could have

concluded that the United States could not afford the forces
and the commitments for which Eisenhower, the Supreme
Commander, had been partly responsible.

Nuclear weapons

saved Eisenhower from such a choice.84
After a visit to the Sixth Fleet in 1951, General
Eisenhower had called for a reexamination of United States'
defense and foreign policy.

President Eisenhower thought

that the militarization of containment and the vast
expansion of America's military might called for by NSC 68
carried with it the seeds of a great irony - the United
States could lose the Cold war by becoming too heavily
armed.85
Prior to his election, Eisenhower had spoken of the
importance of preserving the economic solvency of the United
83R. Gordon Hoxie, "Eisenhower and Presidential
Leadership," Presidential Studies Quarterly. 13 (Fall 1983):
589.
84Kaplan, American Historians and the Atlantic
Alliance. 65.
85Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary, 18 October 1951, DDEL.
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States based on convictions that went back to his assignment
as Army Chief of Staff and Supreme Allied Commander.

During

a meeting with Senator Robert A. Taft following his
nomination, Eisenhower agreed with Taft that overall
government spending, including defense spending, could be
drastically reduced.86

Eisenhower repeated this theme

throughout the campaign, stressing that the largest savings
in government expenditures could be made in the defense
budget, but without any reduction in national security.87
In 1953 Eisenhower took office deeply convinced that
the United States needed a national strategy for the Cold
War, a strategy which would require the selection of broad
national purposes to bring all the agencies of the
government under the control of a single national strategy.
Under Eisenhower the National Security Council became the
principal vehicle for formulating and promulgating this
strategy.88
The national defense policy the Eisenhower
Administration inherited from the Truman Administration came
in the form of NSC 68 and the budget for Fiscal Year 1954.
86New York Times. September 13, 1952.
87Glenn H. Snyder, "The "New Look" of 1953," in
Strategy. Politics, and Defense Budgets. Warner R.
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 389.
88Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, eds., The
President and the Management of National Security (New York,
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 60.
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Eisenhower was thus presented with what he called "the great
question," that is, how to maintain an adequate defense
policy, meet domestic requirements, and still obtain the
budgetary and tax reductions inherent in Republican views on
managing the economy.

Eisenhower determined that he would

plan for the "long haul" rather than the year of maximum
danger espoused by Truman’s planners in NSC 68.89

As he

said in his first inaugural address, he saw a sustained and
uncompromising conflict ahead with the Soviets.
We must be ready to dare all for our country for history
does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or
timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and
display stamina in purpose.90
Eisenhower's criticism of NSC 68 was that it ignored
the connection between national security and fiscal
responsibility.

His April 1953 cut in military

appropriations was a gesture aimed at pacifying Senator
Taft, but real reductions demanded new concepts to replace
those inherited from the Truman Administration.

The Truman

Administration had aimed its planning at a selected year of
crisis - 1954 when it was said that the Soviet Union would
be capable of and most likely to attack the West.

This

concept would result in a stockpile of weapons that would
quickly become obsolete.

The Eisenhower Administration's

89Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 8.
90U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and records Service, 1958),
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 7.
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policy, the "New Look,”

called instead for the development

and maintenance of a strong military posture emphasizing the
capability of "inflicting massive retaliatory damage" by
offensive weapons and the need for a "sound, strong and
growing economy."91
Harkening back to his military organizational
experience, Eisenhower used a collegial approach to
examining defense doctrine.

In June 1953 he directed that

three teams of experts investigate the three alternatives of
foreign policy open to the administration.

George Kennan,

the former Director of the State Department Policy Planning
Staff, led the first group, Task Force A, while Major
General James McCormack, U.S. Air Force, led Task Force B.
General McCormack was a military and political planner as
well as an atomic weapons expert.

Admiral Richard Conolly,

President of the Naval War College, led the final group,
Task Force C.

The Directing Panel of Project Solarium

required each group to write a strategy directive that
reflected the administration's perceptions about the range
of capabilities and actions that the Soviet Union might take
in the years ahead.92
Kennan's group studied a continuation of the policy of
containment as inherited from the Truman Administration
which assumed that the Soviet Union posed a long-term
91FRUS, 1952-54 2:577-597
92Ibid., 392
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political, economic, and ideological threat to the United
States.

McCormack's group assumed that the Soviets were

militarily aggressive, but still cautious and unwilling to
risk a general war or move against interests protected by a
resolute United States which would use nuclear weapons to
punish Soviet aggression.

The last group, led by Conolly,

assumed that the Soviet Union wanted to expand its territory
and influence, and that it was increasing its military
strength and political activity to that end. The Lymnitzer
group examined the substitution of a policy of liberation
for that of containment to roll back Communist borders.93
On 16 July 1953 the Project Solarium Task Forces
presented their alternative basic national security
policies.

President Eisenhower spoke at length after the

presentations and offered a synthesis of the three views.94
While George Kennan had most heavily influenced the
conclusions and recommendations that came out of the
Solarium Project and foresaw a long-term rather than a
short-term threat and a political rather than a military
threat, Eisenhower proposed an essentially military strategy
for the "long haul," but one which would remove the urgency
behind defense appropriations and enable his administration
93Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense
Budgets. 408.
94FRUS. 1954-1954 2:397.
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to spread out expenses.95

Once again Eisenhower had found

the middle road which would enable him to continue to oppose
the Communists yet at the same time to preserve the United
States' democratic institutions and way of life.
Approved on 30 October 1953, the NSC 162 series of
National Security Council papers spelled out the strategy
behind the "New Look."

The armed forces could count on

using nuclear weapons when required.

Force levels were to

be planned on the fundamental national security objective of
deterring Soviet aggression, primarily by means of massive
nuclear retaliation.

Greater reliance would be placed on

indigenous forces to counter local aggressions.

As these

local forces were built up, American ground forces would
e v e n t u a l l y be reduced.

The United States would participate

in local actions mainly through tactical sea and air power
and quickly deployable mobile ground units, presumably using
tactical nuclear weapons.96
NSC 162 determined that the Soviet threat as a total
threat would continue indefinitely.

The Soviets currently

had the capacity to make an effective nuclear attack on the
United States, but did not seem likely to launch an attack
through mid-1955.

The security of the United States

required the "development and maintenance of a strong
95William B. Pickett, "The Eisenhower Solarium Notes,"
The Society for Historians of Foreign Relations Newsletter
16 (June 1985): 4.
96Capitanchik, The Eisenhower Presidency. 42.
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military posture . . . and the maintenance of a sound,
strong and growing economy."97
Other provisions of NSC 162 called for the maintenance
of an atomic capability to counterbalance Soviet atomic
power, the support of overseas bases and allies, and the
maintenance of a sound economy as a basis for high defense
productivity and free institutions.

In the face of the

Soviet military threat and the economic threat of a
continued build-up as in NSC 68,
the United States must develop and maintain, at the
lowest feasible cost, requisite military and nonmilitary
strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet
military aggression against the United States or other
areas vital to its security.98
Eisenhower's strategic concept can be summarized as an
increased reliance on nuclear deterrence and a rejection of
preventive war.

He stressed the new technology of nuclear

weapons and placed heavy reliance on the use of allied land
forces around the Soviet periphery.

Economic strength was

to be achieved through reduced defense budgets.

The United

States and the Free World had to be prepared to continue the
struggle with communism over the coming decades.99
Eisenhower, consistent with his own philosophy of
fiscal conservatism, imposed new budget restraints on
defense spending and looked to nuclear weapons to fill the
97FRUS. 1952-1954 2:582.
"Ibid., 591.
"Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 10.
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gap.

Eisenhower saw a strong national defense and a strong

economy as the twin pillars of national security, but he
faulted Truman for allowing the rapid pace of the buildup to
jeopardize the economy.
Eisenhower established the basic outlines of his
administration's national security policy during the second
half of 1953.

The New Look came to embody a new grand

strategy of diplomatic, military, and economic doctrines and
concepts.

It governed the mobilization, deployment and use

of force as both a deterrent and a defense; it also included
a set of changes in the military establishment aimed at
striking a balance between national security and economic
welfare.100

Eisenhower used his experience in handling

large bureaucracies and his great rapport with the American
people to sell his new and more economical strategy to the
Allies and to his countrymen.101
The military application of the New Look was the
doctrine of massive retaliation which emphasized deterrence
through the threat of nuclear punishment at a time and place
of the United States' choosing.

This restored the

initiative to the United States rather than having it only
respond to the moves or intent of the Soviets.

The reliance

on nuclear weapons also allowed a reduction in military
100Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense
Budgets, 383.
101Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137
manpower, thus achieving a reduction in overall defense
costs.102

Eisenhower, when institutionalizing the New Look,

avoided exacerbating interservice military rivalries by
reallocating resources among the five categories of forces
and by placing greater emphasis than formerly on the
deterrent and destructive power of improved nuclear weapons,
better means of delivery, and more effective air defense
capability.103
Although the New Look can also be seen as the "middle
way" between an all-nuclear strategy on the one hand and a
strategy based solely on conventional forces on the other,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles portrayed it
differently.

In a speech to the Council on Foreign

Relations on 12 January 1954 entitled "Collective Security,"
Dulles spoke of the quest for a maximum deterrent at a
bearable cost.

Local defenses must be reinforced by the

further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

The way for

a free community to deter aggression was to be willing and
able to respond vigorously and at places and with means of
its own choosing.

The basic decision was made to depend

primarily on a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by
means and at places of our choosing.104

Eisenhower himself

102Synder et al, Strategy. Politics, and Defense
Budgets, 384-5.
103Kingseed, "Eisenhower and Suez," 13.
104Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy Management. 26.
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approved Dulles' draft of the speech after making a few
crucial modifications to the remarks.

Eisenhower, ever the

political animal, must have allowed Dulles to enunciate the
new policy in order to maintain his own freedom of movement
as well as to convince critics that defense cuts resulting
from the new policy did not lessen overall strength or
indicate a faltering resolve.
The New Look amounted to a gamble that the
Administration could deter the Soviets through the threat of
nuclear retaliation.

This gamble would save defense costs

and keep the economy strong if it succeeded.

If it failed,

civilization might be trampled by the Soviets in their rush
to take over the West.

Ike, who relished the game of

bridge, held a nuclear trump card which he hoped never to
have to play.105
105Robert L. Ivie, "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior," in
Eisenhower's War of Words ed. Martin J. Medhurst, (East
Lansing MI: Michigan State University, 1994), 9.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Both postwar presidents dealt with the foreign policy
and national security issues that faced them from the depths
of their prepresidential experiences and worldviews.

One

president launched the United States on a course of
confrontation with a hostile power.

The other president

applied a correction to that course that aimed the United
States in the direction of eventual victory.

The

backgrounds and worldviews of both presidents significantly
influenced the lives of their countrymen and the outcome of
the Cold War with the Soviet Union.
Harry Truman became president at a time of great flux
in the United States as it emerged from the longest war of
its history.

As the principal power in the West, the United

States came to oppose an aggressive Eurasian power which it
saw as determined to dominate the world.

Through the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Harry Truman, an
acknowledged neophyte in foreign affairs, placed the United
States directly in the path of the Soviet Union.
Harry Truman was a professional politician, but a man
who believed in himself, kept his word, and expected others
to do the same.

Relying upon a sense and an understanding
139
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of history as a guide to action, Truman brought a plainspoken, common sense approach to foreign affairs.

Arriving

at a critical intersection of historical courses, President
Truman brought the clear-sighted, black-and-white view of
Middle America to bear upon international problems.

If

there were a threat, then all measures possible must be
taken to counter that threat.

History taught that half

hearted measures led to future problems.
In 1953 the country acquired another president, but one
who considered himself an expert in national security
affairs.

Operating from a deeper base of experience and

more secure sense of himself, Eisenhower brought definite
ideas on the management of national security to the
presidency, chief of which was the necessity of aligning the
defense budget to the well-being of the country's economy.
To this end he limited defense spending and re-oriented
national security policy.

From his desire to make a

realistic appraisal of what the maintenance of an adequate,
but not extravagant national defense would cost over an
extended period of time, Eisenhower developed a "new look"
security policy aimed at constructing a viable national
strategy.1
The intent of this national security and foreign policy
initiative was to maintain a military establishment at a
more or less steady level, regardless of short-term changes
^ingseed,

"Eisenhower and Suez," 13.
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in Soviet intentions and capabilities.

This was a change

from the previous policy which responded to Communist
initiatives rather than basing its actions on a long-range
plan.

Reduced defense budgets enabled President Eisenhower

to live up to his campaign promise of reductions in
government spending as well as the reorientation of defense
and foreign policy for the long haul.

This set the United

States on a foreign policy course maintained by succeeding
presidents - a course which eventually parted the Iron
Curtain and broke up the Soviet Union, though not without
exceeding the costs deemed prudent by Eisenhower.

The Long

Telegram had indeed grown into a New Look at foreign policy.
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